

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 050003 61 707138 3 081283 9  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On July 13, 1983, with Units 2 and 3 in Modes 3 and 4, respectively, a

03 penetration seal in Zone 29 was discovered to be inoperable while performing

04 a QC inspection of fire barrier penetrations in Cable Riser Room 236. Fire

05 detectors associated with Zone 29 remained operable. Therefore, in accordance

06 with Technical Specification 3.7.9., Action Statement 'a', an hourly fire

07 watch was established within one hour. Public health and safety were not

08 affected by this event. (See also LER 83-045, Docket No. 50-362.)

09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
A B 11 B 12 C 13 X X X X X X 14 Z 15 Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

18 ACTION TAKEN 19 FUTURE ACTION 20 EFFECT ON PLANT 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD 22 HOURS 23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 24 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

X 18 B 19 Z 20 Z 21 0000 22 N 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of the inoperable seal appears to be an error during construction.

11 Three 1 inch holes extend through the fire barrier penetration. Compensatory

12 fire watches will remain in effect until the inoperable seal is repaired.

13 No further corrective action is required.

14

15 FACILITY STATUS 28 0000 29 NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 B 32 Q C Inspection

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT 33 Z 34 Z 35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 36 NA 37 LOCATION OF RELEASE 38 NA

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 37 000 38 Z 39 NA

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES 40 000 41 NA

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 42 Z 43 NA

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED 44 N 45 NA

NAME OF PREPARER

H. B. RAY

PHONE (714) 492-7700

IE 22

*Southern California Edison Company*

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. B. RAY  
STATION MANAGER

August 12, 1983

RECEIVED  
NRC  
1983 AUG 16 PM 12:37  
SCE  
REGION V  
TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region V  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator


Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 83-091 (Docket No. 50-361)  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Units 2 and 3, respectively, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) 83-091 for an occurrence involving an inoperable sealing device in a fire rated assembly penetration. Since this occurrence involves a shared component between Units 2 and 3, in accordance with NUREG-0161, a single LER for Unit 2 (Docket No. 50-361) is enclosed.

If there are any questions regarding this event, please so advise.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER 83-091

IE-22  
83-326

Mr. J. B. Martin

-2-

August 12, 1983

cc: A.E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)  
J.P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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