NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: G A E I H 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 7 2 7 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 8 1 0 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 07/27/83, while investigating a problem with pressure transmitters,
03 test shop personnel discovered 12 open links in the MSIV leakage control
04 system 2E32. Both divisions of the MSIV leakage control system continued
05 open links and were considered inoperable. This is contrary to the re-
06 quirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.4. The health and safety of the
07 public were not affected by this repetitive event as last reported on
08 LER 50-321/1983-022. Other events are listed in the narrative report.

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
09 C D (11)	A (12)	C (13)	C K T B K R (14)	X (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	0 6 6	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	S 3 7 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Design change request 81-139 required the (2E32) transmitters to be changed
11 The DCR work commenced on 05/13/83, with the transmitters out of
12 service and some wiring changes mode, the decision was made to restore
13 the original transmitters, maintenance was not notified to "REDLINE" the
14 reinstallation. The 12 links for (2E32) transmitters were closed.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: C (28) | % POWER: 0 8 8 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Personnel observation

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

8308190351 830810
PDR ADOCK 05000366
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

IE22

PUBLICITY

20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE: (912)367-7851

GPO 917-926

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-066

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report (by event number):

1. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.4.

2. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.4.

3. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.4.

4. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1.

5. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.6.2.

6. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.1.5.

7. this 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1.

8. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3.

9. This 14 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.f due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1.

10. This 14 day LER is required by Tech Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.4.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s)(by event number):

1. This event was discovered on 07/27/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2145 MWT (approximately 88% power).

2. This event was discovered on 07/27/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2145 MWT (approximately 88% power).

3. This event was discovered on 07/28/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2261 MWT (approximately 93% power).

4. This event was discovered on 07/28/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2295 MWT (approximately 94% power).

5. This event was discovered on 07/28/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2295 MWT (approximately 94% power).

6. This event was discovered on 07/28/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 1177 MWT (approximately 48% power).

7. This event was discovered on 07/28/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2281 MWT (approximately 93% power).

8. This event was discovered on 07/29/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 1500 MWT (approximately 64% power).

9. This event was discovered on 07/29/83 with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 1643 MWT (approximately 67% power).

10. This event was discovered on 08/03/83 with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and reactor power at approximately 0% MWT.

Detailed description of the event(s) (by event number):

1. On 07/27/83, while investigating a problem with a pressure transmitter, test shop personnel discovered six (6) open links going to the following pressure transmitters on the MSIV Leakage Control System (2E32): 2E32-N050 and 2E32-N060 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-184).

2. On 07/27/83, while investigating a problem with a pressure transmitter, test shop personnel discovered six (6) open links going to the following pressure transmitters on the MSIV Leakage Control System (2E32): 2E32-N056 and 2E32-N058 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-185).

NOTE: After the above 2 events were discovered on 7/27/83, an inspection and evaluation involving main control room panels and safety related local panels was performed. This "mispositioned link inspection and evaluation program" was performed 7/28/83 through 7/31/83 by the Q.C. and Engineering Departments. While performing the above mentioned investigation, several links were found open, wires discovered lifted and several valves were found misaligned. The following 7 items list the discoveries:

3. MSIV Leakage Control System (2E32)

   2 wires were found lifted in panel 2H21-P073 which went to pressure transmitters 2E32-N056. These wires should have been connected at AA7 and AA8 of 2H21-P073. (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-186)

4. ATWS Switches (2B21-N045 A & B)

   Reactor Pressure Hi-Hi Switches 2B21-N045 A & B were found to be isolated due to mis-positioned instrument valves (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-187).

5. Hydrogen Recombiner (2T49-Z001B)

   Post LOCA Hydrogen transmitters 2T49-N003B, 2T49-N010B and 2T49-N013B instruments were found to be isolated due to mis-positioned instrument valves (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-188).

6. SBLC Pump Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter (2C41-N004)

   SCLC Pump Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter (2C41-N004) was found to have isolation valve (IV-1) closed (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-189).

7. HPCI Minimum Flow Valve (2E41-F012)

   Link BB-50 in Panel 2H11-P620 was found open (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-190).

8. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker (2E51-F105)

   Link AA-71 in Panel 2H11-P627 was found with its screw threads stripped (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-191).

9. HPCI Room Cooler (2T41-B005B)

   Link TB11-34 in Panel 2H11-P654 was found open (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-192).

10. This event was discovered on 08/03/83.

MSIV leakage control system (2E32)

Root valves for MSIV LCS pressure transmitters 2E32-N051 P, K, B, & F, were found to be closed. (Reference Deviation Report number 2-83-210)

Consequences of the event(s)(by event number):

1. MSIV Leakage Control System (2E32)

a. Initial Evaluation

Inboard system could not be manually initiated. Outboard system would have directed steam through the high pressure flow path of the system. Would Not have directed high pressure steam through the low pressure system at any time. The leakage from the space between the Inborad and Outboard MSIV's would most likely have leaked to the Outboard System. Leakage could have been controlled but in an off normal mode of system operation.

b. Latest Evaluation

The inoperability of instruments 2E32-N056, N058 will send the the MSIV leakage control system logic a false low pressure signal which will allow the manual start of the system with a high pressure in the reactor. The high pressure could cause the outboard system damage.

The inoperability of instruments 2E32-N050, N060, N061P, and N051 B, F, K, and P could allow individual inboard systems to be started with a false signal and make the inboard MSIV leakage control system system inoperable. The inboard system would isolate on high flow after the time delay.

Justification for plant operation without MSIV leakage control system is discussed in our response to IEB 79-01-B report SPG 69:

MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM

As the result of a design review conducted by General Electric, the Main Steam Leakage Control System has been added to the list of systems which are covered in the 79-01B report.

Justification for continued operation is based on the following discussion. Hatch Unit 1 was not licensed with a MSIV leakage control system. In response to NUREG 0737, we have completed an analysis which assesses the dose to the control room operators following a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) assuming a realistic leakage rate through the MSIV's. The results of the calcuation demonstrated that all of the dose values are within the dose limits set forth in SRP 6.4 and GDC-19. Although this analysis has been completed for Unit 1, it is equally applicable to Unit 2 since the units are almost identical.

Further a comparison between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 offsite dose calculations has been completed and has provided assurance that no offsite dose limits will be exceeded assuming no operation of the MSIV Leakage Control System.

Based on the above, continued operation is justified.

2. See No. 1 above.

3. MSIV Leakage Control system (2E32)

a. Initial Evaluation

Inboard system not effected. Outboard system would have directed steam through the high pressure flow path of the system would not have directed high pressure steam through the low pressure system at any time. Leakage could have been controlled but in an off normal mode of system operation.

b. Latest Evaluation

See I.b.

4. ATWS Switches (2B21-N045 A & B)

2B21-N045 A or C will trip the "A" recirculation pump MG set on high reactor pressure. 2B21-N045 B or D will trip the "B" recirculation pump MG set on high reactor pressure. Thus the isolation of 2B21-N045 A & B did not cause ATWS tc have a loss of function.

5. Hydrogen Recombiner (2T49-Z002B)

a. Initial Evaluation

2T49-Z001B was declared INOP due to the transmitters being isolated.

b. Latest Evaluation

2T49-N003B provides over pressure protection for the system. 2T49-N010B provides flow input signal to FIC-1. 2T49-N013B provides flow input signal to FIC-2.

Since the recombiners are not run in the recirculation mode, FIC-2 is not required.

However, FIC-1 is required for operation of the system, since low flow interlock would trip heater. N003B is required for over pressure protection of the system.

If test procedure HNP-2-3607 was done, it would have required calibration of all instruments and check out of all root valve positions.

6. SBLC Pump Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter (2C41-N004)

2C41-N004 feeds pressure signal to 2C41-R600 on Panel 2H11-P603 for indication only. Has no trip functions. Note: The operator would have other indications of SBLC actuation and injection: i.e., pump start indication lights, loss of squibb valve continuity lights, decrease in tank level, and a decrease in reactor power.

7. HPCI Minimum Flow Valve (2E41-F012)

This link provides a close signal to the HPCI pump minimum flow valve (2E41-F012) on a high system flow of 800 GPM (measured by instrument 2E41-N006). With the link open on the HPCI pump minimum flow valve, the conservative assumption was that HPCI would not achieve rated flow at rated pressure. Test or Experiment Request (TER) 83-6 performed on 08/02/83, verified that with the identical link opened on the HPCI pump minimum flow closing circuit (on rising system flow) and with the HPCI pump minimum flow valve open, the HPCI system was able to achieve rated flow of 4250 GPM in the automatic flow control mode. The results were:

Turbine Speed	3700 RPM
Pump Discharge	900 PSIG
Pump Flow Rate	4250 GPM
Rx. Pressure	450 PSIG (Plant was shutting down for an outage).

Stable pump discharge pressures greater than 1000 PSIG were observed at rated system flow, but were not documented on the TER data sheets. It is our belief that the HPCI system would have achieved rated flow at rated pressure had it been required to inject.

8. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker (2E51-F105)

IF this link was open, RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker (2E51-F105) would not close on a coincident high drywell pressure signal and low RCIC steam line pressure signal. This link was found closed but continuity across the link was suspect. The redundant vacuum breaker in the line was operable.

9. HPCI Room Cooler (2T41-B005B)

a. Initial Evaluation

The open link caused the High Temperature Auto Initiation signal to HPCI room cooler (2T41-B005B) to be inoperable. On an auto start signal for the HPCI system, this cooler would have come on regardless of the start signal from room high temperature. Redundant HPCI room cooler (2T41-B005A) (100% capacity) was available.

b. Latest Evaluation

We agree that the open link causes the high temperature auto initiation signal to the "B" HPCI room cooler (2T41-B005B) to be inoperable. In addition, we agree that a HPCI initiation signal would cause the coolers to auto start--the coolers are 100% capacity. If one cooler is secured, it will come on if the breaker of the operating cooler trips.

10. MSIV Leakage Control System 2E32

a. Initial Evaluation

The inboard leakage control system was not declared inoperable because links were closed at this time and lifted wires installed. The system could have been placed into service with these instruments isolated if permissive conditions existed (i.e. less than 35 PSI). The degree of a single fault failure was reduced in that had the N061 pressure devise, which also controls the opening of the 2E32-F001 & 2 valves, failed the system could have been inadvertantly started on a improper permissive signal. No such single failure was experienced for this event. With the transmitters out of service the permissive was given for the heaters in the K, P, B, F, Inboard LCS to turn on. The heaters would not be required at all times but would function in the conservative manner (i.e. they worked when required and also when not required).

b. Latest Evaluation

See 1.b

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems (by event number):

1. Both divisions of the leakage control system contained open links and were considered inoperable for Tech. Specs. purposes.

2. Both divisions of the leakage control system contained open links and were considered inoperable for Tech. Specs. purposes.

3. After restoration of events 1 and 2, the outboard division of the leakage control system contained lifted wires and was considered inoperable for Tech. Specs. purposes.

4. The 2B21-NO45 C & D switches were operable.

5. There are no backup systems for the post LOCA hydrogen transmitters.

6. There are no backup systems for the SBLC pump discharge header pressure transmitter.

7. ADS was operable.

8. There is no backup system for the RCIC system.

9. Redundant cooler "A" was operable.

10. If root valves to 2E32-NO51 B, F, K, P are all closed and all other links and valves are restored to there normal position, then the outboard system is operable and the inboard system would not have met all of its design requirement to protect against a single fault failure.

Justification for continued operation (by event number):

1. Links CC18 thru CC23 in panel 2H11-P664 for the MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-NO5O) and (2E32-NO6O) were closed.

2. Links CC88 thru CC93 in panel 2H11-P665 for the MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-NO56) and (2E32-NO58) were closed.

3. Lifted wires on terminals AA7 and AA8 in Panel 2H21-PO73 for MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-NO56) were reconnected.

4. Unit 2 was placed in a 6 hour LCO as required by Tech. Specs. table 3.3.1-1, ACTION 5. The isolation valves for reactor pressure switches (2B21-NO45 A & B) were returned to the open position.

5. Unit 2 was placed in a 12 hour LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.6.6.2. The isolation valves for Post LOCA Hydroger transmitters (2T49-N003B),(2T49-N010B) (2T49-N013B) were returned to the open position.

6. The isolation valve (i.e., IV-1) for the SBLC pump discharge header pressure transmitter (2C41-N004) was returned to the open position.

7. Unit 2 was placed in a 14 day LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1. ACTION a). Link BB-50 in Panel 2H11-P620 for the HPCI minimum flow valve (2E41-F012) was closed.

8. Link AA-71 in panel 2H11-P627 for the RCIC exhaust vacuum breaker (2E51-F105) was fully closed and tightened.

9. Unit 2 was placed in a 14 day LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1. Link TB11-34 in panel 2H11-P654 for the HPCI pump room cooler (2T41-B005B) hi temperature auto start was closed.

10. The instrument isolation (i.e. root valves) for MSIV leakage control system pressure transmitters 2E32-N051 P, K, B, F were opened.

If repetitive, number of previous LER (by event number):

1. Refer to LER number 50-321/1983-022.

2. Refer to LER number 50-321/1983-022.

3. Refer to LER number 50-321/1983-059.

4. Refer to LER number 50-366/1983-041.

5. Refer to LER number 50-366/1983-041.

6. Refer to LER number 50-366/1983-041.

7. Refer to LER number 50-321/1983-022.

8. N/A

9. Refer to LER number 50-321/1983-022.

10. Refer to LER number 50-366/1983-041.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit (by event number):

1. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

2. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

3. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

4. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

5. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

6. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

7. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

8. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

9. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

10. This event had no impact on Unit 1 or on any other Unit 2 system.

Cause(s) of the event(s)(by event number):

1. DCR 81-139 includes changing out the transmitters from Rosemount to Bartons. The DCR work commenced 5-13-83. With the transmitters out of service and some wiring changes already completed per ATTS design, the decision was made to discontinue the Barton installation and restore the Rosemount instruements. GE was notified to restore the system to its original design. Maintenance was not notified to "Redline" the Rosemount reinstallation. The links that were used to electrically isolate the transmitters for replacement were not reclosed after the Rosemounts were reinstalled.

2. DCR 81-139 includes changing out the transmitters from Rosemount to Bartons. The DCR work commenced 5-13-83. With the transmitters out of service and some wiring changes already completed per ATTS design, the decision was made to discontinue the Barton installation and restore the Rosemount instruements. GE was notified to restore the system to its original design. Maintenance was not notified to "Redline" the Rosemount reinstallation. The links that were used to electrically isolate the transmitters for replacement were not reclosed after the Rosemounts were reinstalled.

3. 2E32-N056 was calibrated on 4/16/80. A review of applicable plant documentation has not revealed any reason for these wires to be lifted.

4. ATWS Switches (2B21-N045 A & B)

The last calibration was performed on 06/05/78 per the "REACTOR PRESSURE (RECIRC. PUMP TRIP) INSTRUMENT FT AND C" procedure (HNP-2-3453). A review of applicable plant documentation has not revealed any reason for the instruments to be isolated since 06/05/78.

. Reason these instruments were not on surveillance program

The reason why the high reactor steam pressure ATWS recirculation pump trip instruments (2B21-N045A-D) are not on the surveillance program at Plant Hatch is as follows:

a. These instruments are ambigously referred (i.e. under a footnote) under the "minimum number of operable channels per trip system(a)" column only, in Tech. Specs. section 3.1.1-1. Tech. Specs. table 3.1.1-1, which is the only reference for these instruments. This table does not list the surveillance frequency requirements; thus they were not included in the existing surveillance program.

5. The valves were verified to be open on 06/27/83 by the "POST LOCA HYDROGEN RECOMBINER" procedure (HNP-2-1235), and they were functionally tested on 06/26/83 by the "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (HEATUP TO 600° F)" procedure (HNP-2-3606), and on 06/29/83 by the "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (HEATUP TO 1200 DEGREES F)" procedure (HNP-2-3607). A review of applicable plant documentation has not revealed any method for these instruments to have been isolated since 06/29/83.

6. This instrument was last demonstrated to be operable during performance of the "STANDBY LIQUID PUMP AND RELIEF VALVE OPERABILITY" PROCEDURE (HNP-2-3703) on 05/27/83. Additionally, the valves were verified to be in the correct position per the "STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL INSTRUMENT VALVE CHECKLIST" procedure (HNP-2-1400) on 06/16/83.

7. Per HNP-2-3303 Step 19 (HPCI Operability Test) the operator is to confirm the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve 2E41-F012 has auto closed during the monthly operability test when the turbine achieves rated speed. HNP-2-3303 was last performed on 07/14/83 and it was complete and satisfactory, thereby proving that link BB-50 was closed at that time. A review of applicable plant documentation has not revealed any reason for this link being opened since 07/14/83.

8. The "RCIC AUTO ISOLATION LSFT" procedure (HNP-2-3418) was performed on 04/05/83, proving link AA-71 was closed. The nut was found in place and there is no reason to believe that continuity within the closed link was lost between 04/05/83 and the time it was repaired on 07/31/83.

9. Link TB11-34 was verified closed on 05/19/83 (per M.R. 2-83-802 and HNP-2-5932) and functionally tested on 06/29/83 (per functional test for DCR 82-004). A review of applicable plant documentation has not revealed any reason for this link to be opened since 06/29/83.

10. The cause of this event is unknown at this time. Only work pertaining to these transmitters was ATTS-DCR 81-129. Clearance 2-83-300 tagged and closed these root valves on 04/11/83. They were verified to be re-opened (by the same clearance) on 05/27/83, which may have resulted in only partial allignment of valves associated with the referenced instruments.

Immediate Corrective Action (by event number):

1. Links CC18 thru CC23 in panel 2H11-P664 for the MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-N050) and (2E32-N060) were closed.

2. Links CC88 thru CC93 in panel 2H11-P665 for the MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-N056) and (2E32-N058) were closed.

3. Lifted wires on terminals AA7 and AA8 in Panel 2H21-P073 for MSIV leakage control system transmitters (2E32-N056) were reconnected.

4. Unit 2 was placed in a 6 hour LCO as required by Tech. Specs. table 3.3.1-1 ACTION 5. The isolation valves for reactor pressure switches (2B21-N045 A & B) were returned to the open position.

5. Unit 2 was placed in a 12 hour LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.6.6.2. The isolation valves for Post LOCA Hydrogen transmitters (2T49-N003B),(2T49-N010B) (2T49-N013B) were returned to the open position.

6. The isolation valve (i.e., IV-1) for the SBLC pump discharge header pressure transmitter (2C41-N004) was returned to the open position.

7. Unit 2 was placed in a 14 day LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1. ACTION a). Link BB-50 in Panel 2H11-P620 for the HPCI minimum flow valve (2E41-F012) was closed.

8. Link AA-71 in panel 2H11-P627 for the RCIC exhaust vacuum breaker (2E51-F105) was fully closed and tightened.

9. Unit 2 was placed in a 14 day LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.1. Link TB11-34 in panel 2H11-P654 for the HPCI pump room cooler (2T41-B005B) hi temperature auto start was closed.

10. The instrument isolation (i.e. root valves) for MSIV leakage control system pressure transmitters 2E32-N051 B, F, K, P were opened at time of discovery.

Supplemental Corrective Action (by event number) :

For 1 thru 9:

A "mispositioned link inspection and evaluation program" was performed on 07/28/83 thru 07/31/83 by the Q.C. and Engineering Departments. THis inspection and evaluation involved control room panels and safety related local panels. The mispositioned links, wires, and instrument valves discovered during this inspection are listed in this LER. no operability problems were identified as a result of link and instrument valve inspections on Unit 1.

10. These valves were not be verified until the Unit was shutdown because they are located in the steam chase which was inaccessable until 1708 hours, August 2, 1983.

Scheduled (future) corrective action (by event number):

1. Instrument valve lineups are being checked and secured (where possible) and a tag signed by person performing the check.

2. Revise procedure HNP-2-1004 for correctness.

3. Existing controls will be modified to stress independent verification for the restoration of any safety-related components that are placed in an off-normal condition.

4. "LIFTED WIRE AND JUMPER CONTROL" procedure will be modified to require its use whenever specific steps in procedures or tests do not restore links, or when "RED LINE" procedures are not used.

5. Administrative controls will be strengthened to ensure that the condition of interrupted work is known and accounted for in consideration of restoration of systems to operability.

6. System restoration will be emphasized in operations, maintenance and QA/QC training programs.

7.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

See scheduled future corrective action.

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

August 10, 1983
GM-83-788

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-066. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.8.b.

for H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/SBT/djs

xc: R. J. Kelly
G. F. Head
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
S. B. Tipps
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document Control

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