

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

PREVIOUS REPORT  
UPDATE REPORT 5-5-83

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

0 1 G A E I H 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CON'T

0 1 7 8  
REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 4 2 0 8 3 8 0 8 0 4 8 3 9  
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During performance of "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C

03 | LEAKAGE TESTS" procedure (HNP-2-3952), several of the primary

04 | containment valves had unacceptable test results. The health and

05 | safety of the public were not affected by this repetitive event as last

06 | reported on LER 50-366/1982-022.

0 7 |

0	9	
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SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
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0 9 7 8

S A 9 10 (11)

E 11 (12)

X 12 (13)

V A L V E X 13 18 (14)

X 19 (15)

D 20 (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR  
83  
21 22

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 23  
027  
24 25 26

OCCURRENCE CODE 27  
03  
28 29

REPORT TYPE 30  
X  
31

REVISION NO. 32  
1  
33

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				
D	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	N	25	W	0	3	0	26
33		34		35		36		37			40	41		42		43		44				47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause for the unacceptable leakage rates for these valves is listed

in the narrative. Corrective maintenance was performed such that

the acceptance criteria of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b, 10CFR50

Appendix J, and ASME section XI, part IWB, are met prior to startup.

1	4	
7	8	9

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	H	25	0	0	0	29	NA	1	21
								Performed LLRT	

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

ACTIVITY CONTENT

RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (2) NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (30)

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 44 45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES					
NUMBER		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	(39)	
0	0	0	2	NA	

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION
1	8	0 0 0 (40) NA

IEZL

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3

7 8 9 10  
PUBLCITY  
8308180384 830804  
PDR ADPOCK 05000244  
NBC USE ONLY

ISSUED		DESCRIPTION (45)		PDR ADDCK 050005888		NAC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	(44)	S		PDR	

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE: (912)367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-366/1983-027, Rev. 1  
UPDATE REPORT-PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 5/5/83

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.d. due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. sections 3.6.1.2.b. and 3.6.1.2.c, 10CFR50 Appendix J, and ASME section XI, Part IWV.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On April 4, 1983, when the RHR minimum flow valve (2E11-F007A) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in hot shutdown.

On April 6, 1983, when the service air isolation valve (2P51-F651) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in cold shutdown.

On April 8, 1983, when the RHR "A" pump section valve (2E11-F004A), "A" RHR loop check valve 2E11-F050A, and drywell pressure instrumentation isolation valves (2E11-F041A, 2E11-F041B, and 2E11-F041D i.e., separate tests) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in cold shutdown at the start of the tests and in refuel by the end of the tests.

On April 9, 1983, when the RCIC pump suction isolation valve (2E51-F003), main steam isolation valve (2B21-F022D), and Hydrogen/Oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F004) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 11, 1983, when the primary feedwater isolation valves (2B21-F010A and 2B21-F077A i. e., separate tests) and Hydrogen/Oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F014) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 12, 1983, when the RCIC steam line isolation valve (2E51-F008) and Hydrogen/Oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F005) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 13, 1983, when the Hydrogen/Oxygen sampling system isolation valves (2P33-F002, 2P33-F011, and 2P33-F012 i.e., separate tests) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 14, 1983, when the RHR "B" pump suction valve (2E11-F004B) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 16, 1983, when the primary feedwater isolation valves (2B21-F010B and 2B21-F077B i.e., separate tests) and reactor water cleanup system isolation valve (2G31-F004) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 17, 1983, when the HPCI pump suction isolation valve (2E41-F042 and 2E51-F051 i.e., one test) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 19, 1983, when the drywell pneumatic return isolation valve (2P70-F020) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 21, 1983, when the vacuum relief isolation valve (2T48-F310) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 25, 1983, when the main steam drain isolation valves (2B21-F016 and 2B21-F019 i.e., one test) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 28, 1983, when the LOCA hydrogen recombiner isolation valve (2T49-F004B) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On April 30, 1983, when the drywell pressure instrumentation line isolation valve (2T48-F363A) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On May 2, 1983, when the drywell pressure instrumentation line isolation valve (2T48-F363B) was tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On May 5, 1983, when the drywell floor drain sump discharge isolation valve (2G11-F004), drywell-to-torus differential pressure system isolation valve (2T48-F209), and suppression pool vent and purge system isolation valve (2T48-F318) were tested and found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

On June 30, 1983, when the chilled water return isolation valve (2P64-F045) was found unacceptable, the unit was in refuel.

Detailed description of the event(s):

During a performance of the "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS" procedure (HNP-2-3952), the following primary containment valves had unacceptable results:

1. RHR "A" pump suction valve (2E11-F004A) would not pressurize and was thus assumed to exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-60).

2. The leakage rate of service air isolation valve (2P51-F651) (i.e., as-found leakage rate of 3100 ACCM) by itself did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La limit (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
3. The leakage rate of RHR pump minimum flow valve (2E11-F007A) (i.e., as-found leakage rate of 2200 ACCM) is not included as part of the .60 La overall leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, the leakage rate must satisfy the requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix J, paragraph III.C.3.b; i.e., "The installed isolation valve seal-water system fluid inventory is sufficient to assure the sealing function for at least 30 days at a pressure of 1.10 PA." (Torus water is seal-water system for this valve.) The leakage rate of this valve by itself did not exceed the limit; however, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the limit (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-60).
4. RHR check valve (2E11-F050A) was leaking in excess of its acceptance criteria (i.e., the test volume would not pressurize). This leakage rate is not included as part of the .60 La overall leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1; however, its leakage rate must satisfy the requirement of ASME Section XI, Part IWV. Thus, since the test volume would not pressurize this requirement was not being met (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-60).
5. The leakage rates of drywell pressure instrumentation isolation valves (2E11-F041A, 2E11-F041B, and 2E11-F041D) (i.e., as found leakage rates of 140 ACCM, 200 ACCM, and 210 ACCM respectively) by themselves would not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valves be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La limit (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
6. The leakage rate of RCIC pump suction isolation valve (2E51-F003) (i.e., as found leakage rate of would not pressurize) was assumed to exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. The leakage rate of hydrogen/oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F004) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 400 ACCM ) by itself did not exceed the limit; however, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La limit. (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62)

7. Main steam isolation valve (2B21-F022D) was leaking such that it exceeded the 11.5 SCFH leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.3 (i.e., as found leakage rate of 22 SCFH) (Refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
8. Primary feedwater isolation valves (2B21-F010A and 2B21-F077A) were leaking such that they would exceed the .009 La (i.e., 544 ACCM) leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.2 (i.e., as found leakage rates of would not pressurize and 1500 ACCM respectively) (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
9. The leakage rate of hydrogen/oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F014) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 350 ACCM) by itself did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La limit (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
10. The leakage rates of RCIC steam line isolation valve (2E51-F008) and Hydrogen/Oxygen sampling system isolation valve (2P33-F005) (i.e., as found leakage rates of would not pressurize for both valves) were such that they were assumed to exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
11. The leakage rates of hydrogen/oxygen sampling system isolation valves (2P33-F002, 2P33-F011, and 2P33-F012) (i.e., as found leakage rates of 650 ACCM, 300 ACCM, and 140 ACCM respectively) by themselves would not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valves be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report numbers 2-83-62 and 2-83-63).
12. The leakage rate (i.e., as found leakage rate of would not pressurize) of RHR "B" pump suction (2E11-F004B) was such that it was assumed to exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
13. The leakage rates of primary feedwater isolation valves (2B21-F010B and 2B21-F077B) and reactor water cleanup system isolation valve (2G31-F004) (i.e., as found leakage rates of would not pressurize, 250 ACCM, and 1100 ACCM respectively) were such that the .009 La (i.e., 544 ACCM) leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.2 was exceeded (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).



14. The leakage rate of HPCI pump suction isolation valves (2E41-F042 & 2E41-F051 i.e., one test) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 1100 ACCM) by themselves did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valves be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
15. The leakage rate of drywell pneumatic return isolation valve (2P70-F020) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 2100 ACCM) by itself did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-62).
16. The leakage rate of vacuum relief isolation valve (2T48-F310) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 2230 ACCM) by itself did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-63).
17. The leakage rate of main steam drain isolation valves (2B21-F016 and 2B21-F019 i.e., one test) (i.e., the as found leakage rate of 600 ACCM) exceeded the .009 La (i.e., 544 ACCM) leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.2. (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-68).
18. The leakage rate of LOCA hydrogen recombiner isolation valve (2T49-F004B) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 2500 ACCM) by itself did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valve be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-82).

19. The leakage rates of drywell pressure instrumentation line isolation valves (2T48-F363A on April 30, 1983, and 2T48-F363B on May 2, 1983) (i.e., as found leakage rates of 1050 ACCM and 2300 ACCM respectively) by themselves did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valves be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-74).
20. The leakage rate of drywell floor drain sump discharge isolation valve (2G11-F004) (i.e., as found leakage rate of 2200 ACCM) exceed the .009 La (i.e., 544 ACCM) leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.2 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-78).
22. The leakage rates of drywell-to-torus differential pressure system isolation valve (2T48-F209) and suppression pool vent and purge system isolation valves (2T48-F318) (i.e., as found leakage rates of 800 ACCM and 190 ACCM respectively) by themselves did not exceed the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1. However, good engineering and maintenance practices dictated that the valves be fixed such that the overall leakage rate would be within the .60 La leakage rate limit of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b.1 (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-78).
23. The leakage rate of chilled water return isolation valve (2P64-F045) (i.e., as found leakage rate of would not pressurize) was such that it was assumed to exceed the leakage rate limit of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Paragraph III C.3.b (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-135).

Consequences of the event(s):

The action required by Tech. Specs. 3.6.1.2. ACTION, RESTORE, b. and c. was achieved prior to startup. The health and safety of the public were not affected by these events.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There were no redundant or backup subsystems or systems.

Justification for continued operation:

The unit was in a refueling outage, and the valves were repaired prior to startup.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This LER is repetitive (in that valves fail LLRT every outage) as last reported by LER 50-366/1982-022.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

There was no impact to other systems and no impact to Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of the unacceptable leakage rates of these primary containment isolation valves is not known; however, the cause for the unacceptable leakage is postulated as a result of normal wear and tear of primary containment isolation valves.

Immediate Corrective Action:

Corrective maintenance was performed such that the primary containment valves which now have unacceptable results met the acceptance criteria of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.1.2.b., 10CFR50 App. J., and ASME Section XI, part IWV prior to startup. The as found, as left, and corrective action for all failed LLRT tests are listed on attached report.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No supplemental corrective action is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No scheduled future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

No further action is required to prevent recurrence.



# PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS FAILURE SUMMARY

E.I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

UNIT TWO

PAGE 1 OF 5

VALVE DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND LEAKAGE	AS LEFT LEAKAGE	REPAIR SUMMARY
Primary Feedwater Isolation Valve (2B21-F010A)	**	0	Replaced right side hinge pin, springs, pressure seals and cleaned.
Primary Feedwater Isolation Valve (2B21-F010B)	**	0	Replaced parts as indicated by Rockwell Representative.
Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve (2B21-F016 & 2B21-F019)	600	0	Repacked 2B21-F016, Lapped wedge, replaced seal rings and repacked 2B21-F019.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (2B21-F022D)	22 ***	6.77***	Replaced stem-disc assembly and disc-piston assembly, machined seat.
Primary Feedwater Isolation Valve (2B21-F077A)	1500	0	Cleaned seat, replaced packing, and gaskets.
Primary Feedwater Isolation Valve (2B21-F077B)	250	45	Welded seat area, then machined seat, replaced packing and gaskets..
RHR "A" Pump suction Valve (2E11-F004A)	**	1100	Resurfaced seat and wedge, replaced seat and wedge.

Leakages in ACCM unless otherwise specified

\* Leakage in SCCM

\*\* Would not pressurize

\*\*\* Leakage in SCFH

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS FAILURE SUMMARY

E.I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

UNIT TWO

PAGE 2 OF 5

VALVE DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND LEAKAGE	AS LEFT LEAKAGE	REPAIR SUMMARY
RHR "B" Pump Suction Valve (2E11-F004B)	**	0	Lapped seat and wedge, replaced packing and gaskets.
RHR "A" Pump Minimum Flow Valve (2E11-F007A)	2200	0	Lapped seat and wedge, replaced packing and gaskets.
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Isolation Valve (2E11-F041A)	140	55	Repacked
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Isolation Valve (2E11-F041B)	200	0	Repacked
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Isolation Valve (2E11-F041D)	210	0	Repacked
RHR "A" Loop Check Valve (2E11-F050A)	**	8796*	Replaced packing and gaskets.

Leakages in ACCM unless otherwise specified

\* Leakage in SCCM

\*\* Would not pressurize

\*\*\* Leakage in SCFH

# PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS FAILURE SUMMARY

E.I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

UNIT TWO

PAGE 3 OF 5

VALVE DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND LEAKAGE	AS LEFT LEAKAGE	REPAIR SUMMARY
HPCI Pump Suction Isolation Valve (2E41-F042 and 2E41-F051)	1100	1400	Resurfaced seat, replaced packing, and gaskets for 2E41-F042. Note: Observed no bubbles in torus on initial test (2E41-F051 no leakage); however, on final test observed bubbles in torus. The leakage for 2E41-F051 was postulated as trash on seat due to 2E41-F051 being gagged for repairs on 2E11-F042.
RCIC Pump Suction Isolation Valve (2E51-F003)	**	50	Adjusted stops, checked limits, and stroked valve.
RCIC Steam Line Isolation Valve (2E51-F008)	**	50	Polished stem and wedge, cleaned, replaced packing and gaskets.
Drywell Floor Drain Sump Discharge Isolation Valve (2G11-F004)	2200	0	Cleaned and repacked.
Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Valve (2G31-F004)	1100	0	Lapped scatch off wedge, replaced packing and gaskets.
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F002)	650	0	Cleaned, blued, and replaced packing and gaskets.

Leakages in ACCM unless otherwise specified

\* Leakage in SCCM

\*\* Would not pressurize

\*\*\* Leakage in SCFH

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS FAILURE SUMMARY

E.I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

UNIT TWO

PAGE 4 OF 5

VALVE DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND LEAKAGE	AS LEFT LEAKAGE	REPAIR SUMMARY
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F004)	400	40	Cleaned seat and replaced packing and gaskets.
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F005)	**	90	Cleaned seat and replaced packing and gaskets.
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F011)	300	Less than 20	Cleaned, replaced packing and gaskets.
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F012)	140	35	Cleaned, replaced packing and gaskets.
Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling System Isolation Valve (2P33-F014)	350	50	Cleaned, replaced packing and gaskets.
Service Air Isolation Valve (2P51-F651)	3100	40	Lapped seat, repacked.
Chilled Water Supply Isolation Valve (2P64-F045)	**	160	Cleaned, replaced packing and gaskets.

Leakages in ACCM unless otherwise specified

\* Leakage in SCCM

\*\* Would not pressurize

\*\*\* Leakage in SCFH

# PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B & TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS FAILURE SUMMARY

E.I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

UNIT TWO

PAGE 5 OF 5

VALVE DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND LEAKAGE	AS LEFT LEAKAGE	REPAIR SUMMARY
Drywell Pneumatic Return Isolation Valve (2P70-F020)	2100	700	Lapped poppet and seat.
Drywell-To-Torus Differential Pressure System Isolation Valve (2T48-F209)	800	70	Replaced wedge, packing and gaskets.
Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve (2T48-F310)	2230	60	Packed and installed new "O" rings.
Suppression Pool Vent and Purge System Isolation Valve (2T48-F318)	190	0	Cleaned seating area, replaced "O" rings and seals.
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Line Isolation Valve (2T48-F363A)	1050	20	Lapped needle to seat.
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Line Isolation Valve (2T48-F363B)	2300	0	Lapped needle to seat.
LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner Return Isolation Valve (2T49-F004B)	2500	130	Cleaned, lapped and repacked.

Leakages in ACCM unless otherwise specified

\* Leakage in SCCM

\*\* Would not pressurize

\*\*\* Leakage in SCFH



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USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

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
August 4, 1983  
GM-83-714

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-027, Rev. 1. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.d.

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

*SL*  
HCN/SBT/djs

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