

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE							14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT		58

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	6	6	7	0	7	0	9	8	3	8	0	8	0	4	8	3	9
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					68	69	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80			

0 2 | On 07/09/83 RCIC was not proven operable within 12 hours after adequate
0 3 | reactor pressure as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3., ACTION b
0 4 | (D.R. 2-83-147) on 07/09/83, after performance of the 18 month "RCIC
0 5 | PUMP OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-2-3405), and after placing RCIC in
0 6 | standby mode, it self started. RCIC was declared inoperable per Tech.
0 7 | Specs. section 3.7.3 (D.R. 2-83-149. Refer to narrative). The health
0 8 | and safety of the public were not affected by these non-repetitive events.

09		SYSTEM CODE		C	E	11	CAUSE CODE		E	12	CAUSE SUBCODE		A	13	COMPONENT CODE				R	E	L	A	Y	X	14	COMP. SUBCODE		J	15	VALVE SUBCODE		Z	16							
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENCE REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER												
17		83		050		03		L		0		C		X		Z		Z		0000		Y		N		N		S440												

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Personnel were attempting to prove RCIC operability, but a damaged bearing temperature switch prevented completion at the test within 12 hours (DR 2-83-147). RCIC spuriously started because an oversensitive time delay relay (2E52-K51) opened the steam supply valve. The relay was replaced, and RCIC was satisfactorily functionally tested per HNP-2-3405.

1 5 C 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 31 B 32 Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 10 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	7	00	Z	NA

		PERSONNEL INJURIES						
		NUMBER			DESCRIPTION			
1	8	0	0	0	(40)	(41)	NA	

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12	
TYPE		DESCRIPTION		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT		CIRCUIT	
1	9	Z	42																				

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (43) NA

9308180321 830804
PDR ADCK 05000366
S PDR

I722
1/1

8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NA
2 0 N (44)
NRC USE ON

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

I722

NRC USE ONLY

GPO 917-926

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-050

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

1. This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3, ACTION b.
2. This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

1. The plant was in startup and hot standby at approximately 165 PSIG reactor pressure (1% power).
2. The plant was in startup and hot standby at approximately 150 PSIG reactor pressure (0% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

1. This event is a failure to prove RCIC operability within 12 hours after steam pressure was adequate to perform the test as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3., ACTION b (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-147).
2. On 07/09/83, after performance of the "RCIC PUMP OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-2-3405), operations personnel were attempting to place RCIC in normal standby configuration. When the operator reset the automatic initiation signal, the steam supply valve (2E51-F045) opened and RCIC started. RCIC was declared inoperable. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3. (refer to Deviation Report number 2-83-149).

Consequences of the event(s):

1. This event had no effect on plant operations. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
2. This event had no effect on plant operations. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

1. HPC1 was operable during this event.
2. HPC1 was operable during this event.

Justification for continued operation:

1. Operation was continued as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3, ACTION a.
2. Operation was continued as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.3, ACTION a.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

1. This event is non-repetitive.
2. This event is non-repetitive.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

1. This event had no impact upon any other Unit 2 system, nor on Unit 1.
2. This event had no impact upon any other Unit 2 system, nor on Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

1. While personnel were attempting to prove RCIC operability, a damaged temperature switch on RCIC turbine coupling and bearing caused an erroneous high temperature annunciation in the control room. Consequently, RCIC operability was not proven within the required time limit.
2. An engineering evaluation revealed that this event was caused primarily by a 4.5 MA ground fault at the negative terminal of station battery 2A. Ground faults as well as voltage transients (due to control switching) caused an overvoltage condition which exceeded the maximum voltage that the existing RCIC steam inlet valve time delay relay (2E51-K51) could withstand. The ground fault and voltage transients caused the RCIC steam inlet valve time delay relay to time erratically and open the RCIC steam supply valve (2E51-F045) which caused RCIC to inadvertently start.

Immediate Corrective Action:

1. The RCIC turbine coupling and bearing temperature indicator (1E51-N753) was removed and a direct reading local thermometer was temporarily installed.
2. The excessively sensitive time delay relay was replaced with a less sensitive model per a design change request. RCIC was satisfactorily functionally tested per HNP-2-3405 on 07/12/83. The station service battery ground is no longer present.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

1. A standing order was issued per the "PLANT OPERATING ORDERS" procedure (HNP-12) on 07/09/83. This requires a visual check of bearing temperature within 10 minutes after any RCIC start, and every 30 minutes thereafter while it is running.
2. No supplemental action is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

1. A new RCIC turbine coupling end bearing temperature indicator will be installed when it is received on site.
2. No future corrective action is scheduled.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

1. N/A
2. N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

83 AUG 11 A10: 38

August 4, 1983


GM-83-727

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-050. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

HC
HCN/SBT/djs

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