

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
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C	A	S	O	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58CON'T

0	1
---	---

 REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	6	1	7	0	4	2	1	8	3	8	0	5	0	5	8	3	9
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7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 SCE was notified on April 21, 1983 by Combustion Engineering Company (C-E) that the

0 3 high steam generator differential pressure setpoint used in the PPS Emergency

0 4 Feedwater System logic circuitry resulted in an actual trip setpoint 300 psid higher

0 5 than that assumed in our FSAR. Unit 2 operated in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with the

0 6 erroneous setpoints therefore LCO 3.3.2 was exceeded. Public health and safety were

0 7 not affected.

0	9
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7 8 9
SYSTEM CODE

I	B	11
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 CAUSE CODE

B	12
---	----

 CAUSE SUBCODE

A	13
---	----

 COMPONENT CODE

I	N	S	T	R	U	14
---	---	---	---	---	---	----

 COMP. SUBCODE

Y	15
---	----

 VALVE SUBCODE

Z	16
---	----

9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

8	3	17
---	---	----

 EVENT YEAR

8	3	21
---	---	----

 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.

0	3	7	24
---	---	---	----

 OCCURRENCE CODE

0	1	28
---	---	----

 REPORT TYPE

T	30
---	----

 REVISION NO.

0	32
---	----

ACTION TAKEN

E	18
---	----

 FUTURE ACTION

Z	19
---	----

 EFFECT ON PLANT

Z	20
---	----

 SHUTDOWN METHOD

Z	21
---	----

 HOURS

0	0	0	0	22
---	---	---	---	----

 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED

Y	23
---	----

 NPD-4 FORM SUB.

N	24
---	----

 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER

N	25
---	----

 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

Z	9	9	9	26
---	---	---	---	----

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 While reviewing the PPS setpoint calculations for another C-E supplied Nuclear Steam

1 1 Supply System, C-E engineers discovered an error in the pressure to voltage conversion

1 2 equation for steam generator delta pressure setpoint calculations. The equation did

1 3 not compensate for the inversion of one of the input signals. The resultant voltage

1 4 was one volt higher than it should be. (See attachment.)

1	5
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 FACILITY STATUS

B	28
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 % POWER

0	0	0	29
---	---	---	----

 OTHER STATUS

NA	30
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 METHOD OF DISCOVERY

D	31
---	----

 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

NSSS Vendor Notification	32
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7 8 9 10 13 13 44 45 46 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT

Z	33
---	----

 RELEASED OF RELEASE

Z	34
---	----

 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

NA	35
----	----

 LOCATION OF RELEASE

NA	36
----	----

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER

0	0	0	37
---	---	---	----

 TYPE

Z	38
---	----

 DESCRIPTION

NA	39
----	----

7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER

0	0	0	40
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 DESCRIPTION

NA	41
----	----

7 8 9 11 12 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE

Z	42
---	----

 DESCRIPTION

NA	43
----	----

7 8 9 10 80
PUBLICITY
ISSUED

N	44
---	----

 DESCRIPTION

NA	45
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7 8 9 10 808305160069 830505
PDR ADOCK 05000361
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

H. B RAY

PHONE

714/492-7700

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-037
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING COMPANY
UNIT No. 2, Docket No. 50-361

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

This one volt increase caused the trip setpoint to be 300 psid higher than the correct value. The SONGS Unit 2 PPS setpoint calculations were rechecked and it was discovered that they contained the same error. C-E has reviewed the setpoint calculation to assure that the High Steam Generator Delta Pressure trip is the only application where this type of error could exist.

The affected setpoints have now been correctly installed in the PPS and the system presently functions as described in the Safety Analysis Report. No further corrective actions are required.