



THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

ILLUMINATING BLDG. ■ PUBLIC SQUARE ■ CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 ■ TELEPHONE (216) 623-1350 ■ MAIL ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 5000

Serving The Best Location in the Nation

Murray F. Edelman
MANAGER
NUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE
DEPARTMENT

May 6, 1983

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Interim Report Regarding
Restart of the Control
Complex Chiller [RDC 70(83)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter serves as the interim report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the potential significant deficiency concerning restart of the Control Complex Chiller following either a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This problem was identified to Mr. Pelke of your office on April 7, 1983, by Mr. E. Riley of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company.

This report contains a description of the deficiency and the corrective action to be implemented.

Description of Deficiency

Either a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) will cause a trip of the control complex chiller which is operating. Present design would leave the chiller inoperable for a minimum of twenty minutes due to protective interlocks. Operator action would be required to start the chiller. This design conflicts with FSAR Section 9.4.9.5.1a, for a LOOP, which specifies an automatic restart. Both the LOOP and LOCA condition also conflict with ANSI-N660 "Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions" which does not allow credit for operator action in the first ten minutes. After that initial period, several manual steps must be taken to start a chiller. Total down time would be approximately eighteen minutes. The temperature reached in the control room by this time could compromise the capabilities of both the control room operator and the safety-related equipment contained therein.

In addition, assuming a single failure in the redundant chiller, the time to restore a chiller would be in excess of twenty minutes. This would create even a more severe temperature problem in the control room.

8305130248 830506
PDR ADDCK 05000440
S PDR

1E27
MAY 11 1983


Corrective Action

On March 30, 1983, Corrective Action Request 83-06 was issued to Gilbert Associates, Inc. (GAI), our Architect/Engineer, to obtain an evaluation of this situation. This evaluation will include identifying the cause and extent of this type of occurrence and also recommendations for corrective action to be taken. The initial completion date for this evaluation was April 26, 1983. On April 27, 1983, however, the Assistant Project Manager for GAI notified the site personnel Quality Assurance Follow-up Engineer that further evaluation was necessary. In addition, GAI has reported the event to the NRC as a "potential" reportable event under 10CFR21.

GAI has established July 30, 1983, as the new completion date for the evaluation. We are presently planning to submit our final report on this subject by August 15, 1983.

Please call if there are additional questions.

Sincerely,



Murray R. Edelman
Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:pab

cc: Mr. M. L. Gildner
NRC Site Office

Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
c/o Document Management Branch
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center, SEE IN
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339