

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80									
G A E I H 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5									
LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58									
CON'T 0 1									
REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 1 2 7 8 3 8 9									
DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80									
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10									
On 1/27/83, while performing the "FIRE PROTECTION ISOLATION VALVES-									
POSITION AND LUBRICATION CHECKS" procedure (HNP-2-3358), the lube oil									
room deluge system's isolation valve (2U43-F101) was found locked closed									
for no known reason. On 4/14/83, the PRB determined that this event was									
reportable under Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c. Plant operation was not									
affected. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this									
non-repetitive event.									
SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 13 14 COMPONENT CODE 15 16 COMP. SUBCODE 17 18 VALVE SUBCODE 19 20									
A B 11 A 12 X 13 V A L V E X 14 E 15 D 16									
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32									
8 3 0 1 9 0 3 L 0									
ACTION TAKEN 33 34 FUTURE ACTION 35 36 EFFECT ON PLANT 37 38 SHUTDOWN METHOD 39 40 HOURS 41 42 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 43 44 NPD-4 FORM SUB. 45 46 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 47 48 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 49 50									
X 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 A 25 G 2 5 6 26									
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27									
An investigation conducted by plant personnel could determine no									
reason for the valve's being closed. The 2U43-F101 was opened and									
locked immediately upon discovery.									
FACILITY STATUS 28 29 % POWER 30 31 OTHER STATUS 32 33 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 34 35 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 36 37									
E 28 0 7 0 29 NA B 31 Routine Inspection									
ACTIVITY CONTENT 38 39 RELEASED OF RELEASE 40 41 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 42 43 LOCATION OF RELEASE 44 45									
Z 33 Z 34 NA									
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 46 47 NUMBER 48 49 TYPE 50 51 DESCRIPTION 52 53									
0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA									
PERSONNEL INJURIES 54 55 NUMBER 56 57 DESCRIPTION 58 59									
0 0 0 40 NA									
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 60 61 TYPE 62 63 DESCRIPTION 64 65									
Z 42 NA									
PUBLICITY 66 67 ISSUED 68 69 DESCRIPTION 70 71									
N 44 NA									
NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE (912)367-7851									

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-019

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c. due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.2.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On 1/27/83, the unit was in steady-state power operation at 1703 MWt (approximately 70 percent power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 1/27/83, while personnel were performing the "FIRE PROTECTION ISOLATION VALVES - POSITION AND LUBRICATION CHECKS" procedure (HNP-2-3358), the isolation valve (1U43-F101) for the lube oil room deluge system was found locked in the closed position. This valve must be in the open position for the deluge system to be operable, thus this event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.2.

On 2/1/83, the event of 1/27/83 was recognized by site personnel and a deviation report (2-83-13) was written. On 3/15/83, the PRB determined the event non-reportable due to the assumption that the valve was not inoperable for more than 14 days; however, additional investigation was requested to determine the reason for the valve's being closed.

On 4/14/83, the PRB re-evaluated the event and determined to report this event due to its showing a lack of administrative control.

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation was not affected. The valve was opened immediately upon discovery and the system returned to normal operable status. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There was no redundant system.

Justification for continued operation:

The valve was returned to the normal open position and locked immediately upon discovery. Thus, the deluge system was returned to the normal mode of operation.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive. This is an isolated event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other Unit 2 system; this event had no effect on Unit. 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

An investigation conducted by plant personnel could determine no reason for the valve's being locked closed.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The valve was immediately opened and locked upon discovery.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was sufficient and nothing more is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

The immediate corrective action taken was sufficient and nothing more is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

Nothing is required. This is an isolated event.