Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

April 26, 1983
G02-83-389

Mr. J. B. Martin
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject: NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
REPORTABLE 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITIONS #221, NAMCO EA-180 AND EA-740 LIMIT SWITCHES AND #226, 125VDC MOTOR OPERATOR CONNECTED TO A 250 VDC POWER SOURCE

References:
a. Telecon dated January 4, 1983 (QA2-83-003), L.C. FLoyd to J. Elin.

b. Telecon dated January 7, 1983 (QA2-83-010), L.C. Floyd to J. Elin.

c. Letter #G02-83-87, R.G. Matlock to R.H. Engelken, dated February 2, 1983.

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was informed by telephone, of the above potentially reportable conditions. Attachments I and II provide the Project's interim reports on the above conditions. We will continue to provide your office with quarterly updates until resolved. The next report will be submitted by July 26, 1983.

If you have any questions regarding these subjects, please contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.

C.S. Carlisle
Program Director, WNP-2

LCF/kd

Attachments: (2) As stated

cc: W.S. Chin, BPA - Site
A. Forrest, Burns and Roe - HAPO
N.D. Lewis, EFSEC
A. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector - Site
WNP-2 Files/917B/917Y

IE 27

ATTACHMENT I

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-397
LICENSE NO. CPPR-93
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #221
NAMCO EA180 AND EA740 LIMIT SWITCHES

INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Unqualified NAMCO EA740 limit switches SGT-POS-V/2A and SGT-POS-V/2B are installed in Class 1E applications and are required to function during a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

Safety Implication

These limit switches are used to indicate the positions (open/close) of safety related valves. Failure of the limit switches could result in erroneous valve position indication, thereby causing operator confusion or error during a DBA.

Corrective Action

Limit switches SGT-POS-V/2A and SGT-POS-V/2B will be replaced with qualified Class 1E limit switches. Additionally, other Class 1E applications of NAMCO EA-180 and EA-740 limit switches are being reviewed for installation of unqualified limit switches.

Status of Corrective Action

A review is being performed to identify the locations of unqualified NAMCO EA-180 and EA-740 limit switches. A Project Engineering Directive (PED) will be issued directing the replacement of unqualified NAMCO EA-180 and EA-740 limit switches identified during the review. Quarterly reports will be filed with your office until resolved.

ATTACHMENT II

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-397
LICENSE NO. CPPR-93
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #226
125VDC MOTOR OPERATOR CONNECTED TO 250VDC POWER SOURCE

INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The 125 Volt DC motor operator for valve RCIC-V-69, as installed, represents a nonconforming condition to the design in that the nameplate voltage (125 Volt DC) is incorrect and inconsistent with the design voltage specified (250 Volt DC).

This inconsistency was originally discovered by the Architect Engineer while reviewing vendor drawings submitted for approval. This inconsistency was evaluated as a noncompliance, but not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). However, as the nonconforming motor operator was not returned to the vendor and was in fact installed, it constitutes a noncompliance.

Analysis of Safety Implication

In the highly unlikely event that any one or all of the startup functional test programs would not have detected the noncompliance, the following safety significant condition would result.

RCIC-V-69 is designed to provide containment isolation and vacuum pump discharge valving to the supression pool.

Failure of the valve in the open position would degrade primary containment isolation capability. However, containment integrity would not be violated, since a check valve is located outboard from RCIC-V-69. The condition would be a violation of containment isolation criteria and would be considered reportable.

Failure of the valve in the closed position would eliminate vacuum to the barometric condenser. This vacuum loss would prevent and/or terminate RCIC turbine operation. The reactor core isolation cooling system is designed to maintain or supplement reactor vessel water inventory during the following conditions:

1. Normal Operation. When the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and maintained in the hot standby condition.

2. Normal Operation. When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater condition.

3. When required as a backup to the High Pressure Core Spray System to mitigate the consequences of the rod drop accident by automatically supplying cooling water to the reactor if vessel low water is sensed.

Due to item 3 above, the failure would be considered reportable.

Status of Corrective Action

A new motor operator has been ordered for RCIC-V-69, and Nonconformance Report NCR-020634 has been initiated to identify the nonconforming condition.

A review and field inspection has been performed of all DC motor operated valves (MOV's) to compare the voltage rating to the applicable bus voltage has been performed. One additional valve, RCIC-V-19, has been identified as not being compatible. All other valves are compatible. RCIC-V-19 has been identified on Nonconformance Report NCR-20632, and a new motor has been ordered to replace the existing one. In addition, all AC motors have been reviewed for compatibility, and are compatible for 460 VAC, 3 phase operation.