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May 9, 1983

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Request for Information from the Auxiliary
Systems Branch

Reference: Letter from A. Schwencer to E. G. Bauer dated
April 22, 1983


File: GOVT 1-1 (FSAR)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The attached documents are draft responses to Questions 410.100
thru 410.104.

These changes will be formally incorporated into the FSAR revision
scheduled for May, 1983.

Sincerely,


Eugene J. Bradley

JTR/gra/B-12

cc: See Attached Service List

8305130096 830509
PDR ADOCK 05000353
A PDR

13001

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QUESTION 410.100 (Section 9.1.2)

Revision 14 to the FSAR states that leakage through the spent fuel pool liner will be "detected by observation of water flowing out of the piping into the dirty radwaste funnel." This is not acceptable. Provide a means to measure the flow rate, a control room alarm, and a description of the procedure to determine where the leak is in the pool. In addition, verify that procedures will exist for repairing any detected leaks.

RESPONSE

Section 9.1.2.2.2 has been revised to provide a more detailed discussion of the ~~the~~ spent fuel pool leak detection system.

continuous occupational exposure during normal operations.

- j. Applicable codes and standards are provided in Table 9.1-21.

9.1.2.2 Facility Description

9.1.2.2.1 General Description

The spent fuel storage facility consists of the spent fuel pool, containing anodized aluminum spent fuel storage racks, and serves as the storage area for irradiated fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pool and the adjacent reactor well, dryer/separator pool, and cask loading pit are located in the refueling area as shown in Figure 1.2-14. Figure 9.1-34 shows the arrangement of the spent fuel storage racks. Cooling and cleanup of the spent fuel pool water is discussed in Section 9.1.3. Fuel handling systems are discussed in Section 9.1.4. The reactor enclosure crane is discussed in Section 9.1.5.

9.1.2.2.2 Component Description

Spent Fuel Pool - The spent fuel pool is a post-tensioned, reinforced concrete structure that forms an integral part of the reactor enclosure. The pool has a volume of approximately 46,000 ft³ and is filled with demineralized water to a normal depth of 38 feet, 3 inches. This provides about 23 feet of water above the tops of the stored fuel assemblies.

The spent fuel pool is lined with stainless steel plate to minimize leakage and reduce corrosion product formation. A leakage collection system is provided to permit expedient detection of leaks through the stainless steel liner plate and to prevent the uncontrolled loss of pool water to areas below the pool. Drainage paths, designed to permit free gravity flow, are formed by welding channels behind the pool wall liner welded joints and by two trench monitoring systems embedded in the floor slab below the floor liner. The design of ~~the~~^a typical drainage system is shown in Figure 9.1-40. Pool leakage is routed through a piping system, provided at the base of the pool wall, to ~~the~~^{one of three} dirty radwaste funnels as shown in Figure 9.1-3. Leakage from each of 7 segments of the leak collect system is routed through separate piping to enable identification of the area which is leaking.

Leakage is detected by observation of water flowing out of the piping into the dirty radwaste funnels (Figure 9.1-3) or by low level indication in the skimmer surge tank or the spent fuel pool (Figure 9.1-3). ~~The leakage rate is limited by the 1-inch liner drain lines, and leaks can be visually identified and isolated by closing the manual isolation valves as required.~~

Control rod storage hangers in the spent fuel pool provide storage capacity for 76 control rods.

Rev. 16, 01/83

Flow into the funnels is observed during periodic operator inspections. Skimmer surge tank low level alarms and trips are described in Section 9.1.3.5.

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QUESTION 410.101 (Section 9.2.5)

Provide a discussion of the procedure to test for waterhammer in the ultimate heat sink spray tree network. Include in the discussion what type of instrumentation will be used to monitor for waterhammer during the test and where it will be located.

RESPONSE

on the spray networks. Transient ^{potential} effects analyses have been performed to determine the effects of waterhammer. These analyses indicate that waterhammer loads will not be significant and are adequately provided for in the design of the spray networks. No special testing for waterhammer loads will be performed.

DRAFT

QUESTION 410.102 (Section 9.4.1)

Revision 13 to the FSAR changed Figure 9.4-1 Sheet 1 to show that the control room air system is no longer seismic Category I. Provide justification for having nonseismic Category I air system for the control room.

RESPONSE

The change to Figure 9.4-1 Sheet 1 ^{was} ~~is~~ a drafting error. Figure 9.4-1 Sheet 1 has been revised to show that the control room air system is Seismic Category I.

410.102

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
LOW VOLT GENERATING STATION
UNITS 1 AND 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

CONTROL STRUCTURE
HVAC SYSTEM
P&ID

SHEET 1 OF 3

FIGURE B.6-1

REV. 10/82



REFERENCE DRAWINGS		
P & I D NO.	FSAR NO.	FIG. NO.
M-18	9.2-5	
M-22	9.2-1	
M-78	9.2-1	
M-90	9.2-28	

put "railroad hatching" in
See previous figure
attached.

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
LAMERICK GENERATING STATION
UNITS 1 AND 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

CONTROL STRUCTURE HVAC
SYSTEM P & ID

FIGURE 8.6-1

NO. OF SHEETS 86-40

SHEET 1 OF 5



REFERENCE DRAWINGS		
P & ID NO.	ISSUE NO.	FIG. NO.
M-18	9.2-5	
M-22	9.3-1	
M-76	9.4-1	
M-90	9.2-28	

QUESTION 410.103 (Section 9.4.2)

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The FSAR Figure 9.4-2 does not indicate where the HVAC ductwork goes beyond HV-119. Provide a revised figure which identifies where this duct goes and all other figures, not already part of the FSAR, which will show its continuation.

RESPONSE

(Revision 20, dated 5/83)

Figure 9.4-2 has been revised[↑] and is provided in Section 9.4.

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QUESTION 410.104 (Section 10.3.1 and 10.4.5)

Revision 14 to the PSAR changed the classification of the main steam and feedwater piping to non-Q piping. Provide a discussion justifying these pipes being non-Q.

RESPONSE

Table 3.2-1, ~~sheet 14 and 15~~, shows the main steam and feedwater piping, ~~respectively~~ as Q-listed. A drafting error on Figure 5.1-3 eliminating the Q designation has been corrected and a revised Figure 5.1-3 is provided.

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410.104

