

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1													2													3													4													5
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38																						
		L I C E N S E E C O D E												L I C E N S E N U M B E R												L I C E N S E T Y P E												C A T															

CON T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 7 0 4 2 4 8 3 8 0 5 0 6 8 3 9  
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During fuel unloading at the beginning of a refueling outage, 130 fuel bundles  
0 3 | were unloaded from the unit 1 core into a high-density spent fuel storage rack  
0 4 | (HDSFSR) that had not had the required post installation test for presence  
0 5 | of Boron. Units 2 and 3 were not affected by this event. Technical  
0 6 | Specification 5.5.B requires K effective of the spent fuel storage pool to be  
0 7 | less than 0.95. Post installation tests prove the presence of Boron to assure  
0 8 | K effective less than 0.95. There was no effect on the health and safety of  
the public.

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
0	9	F	B	A	X	F	U	E	L	X	X	Z	Z				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
17	8	3	—	0	2	1	/	0	1	T	—						
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
X	18	G	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	Z	25
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Personnel failed to verify acceptability of the HDSFSRs prior to preparation

1 1 of the fuel assembly transfer forms (FATFs). Additionally, plant procedures

1 2 were inadequate in that neither they nor the refueling floor tagboard

1 3 identified the untested HDSFSRs. Plant procedures will be modified to

1 4 provide tracking of HDSFSR testing.

8 9  
FACILITY STATUS      % POWER      OTHER STATUS      (30)      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION      (32)

1 5    H    (28)    0 0 0    (29)    NA    A    (31)    Engineer Observation    90

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE      AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY      (35)      LOCATION OF RELEASE      (36)

1 6    Z    (33)    Z    (34)    NA    NA    90

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION (39)						
1	7	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA			

7	8	9	11	12	13	80
PERSONNEL INJURIES						
NUMBER		DESCRIPTION				(41)

1 8 0 0 40 NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		43
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	

1 9 2 42 NA 80

[illegible]

NAME OF PREPARER D. R. Whitson

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83021 Technical Specification Involved 5.5.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a(2) \* Date Due NRC 5/8/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in a refueling outage. Units 2 and 3 were operating at 79 and 92 percent respectively. Units 2 and 3 were not affected by this event. At 1355 it was observed that 130 fuel bundles had been unloaded from the core into a high-density storage rack (HDSFSR) in the spent fuel storage pool that had not had required post-installation test for proper boron. Technical Specification 5.5.B requires K effective of the spent fuel storage pool to be less than 0.95. Post-installation tests prove the presence of boron to assure K effective less than 0.95. Fuel handling operations were halted and the problem was investigated. A field change was initiated to the fuel assembly transfer forms. Movement of the fuel to a tested HDSFSR was begun, but was subsequently suspended at 2150 hours for a safety analysis to address unloading of fuel in the untested HDSFSR. After receipt of the safety analysis, and proper identification of tested HDSFSRs on the refuel floor and control room tag-boards the remaining bundles were moved into a tested HDSFSR. There was no indication that the K effective of the pool ever exceeded 1.0.

Personnel failed to thoroughly verify the proper status of the HDSFSR in the spent fuel storage pool. In addition, plant FATF procedures were inadequate since neither they nor the refuel floor tagboard identified untested HDSFSRs. Also, the tagboards in the control room did not indicate the status of the HDSFSRs. The untested HDSFSR was installed in the pool on June 30, 1982.

Plant procedures will be modified to document which HDSFSRs have been fully tested. A control form will be included in workplans related to installation of fuel racks to provide positive control for updating plant procedures and plant tagboards. In addition, second person verification by a nuclear engineer will be added to fuel assembly transfer forms. A discussion regarding this event, the circumstances leading up to the event and corrective action was held (see Attachment A)

\* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP

Attachment "A"

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
BFRO-50-259/83021

April 26, 1983. A follow-up report will be submitted after the boron test for the rack has been completed.