

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

PHONE (205) 729-0841

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83016 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(1)* Date Due NRC 5/6/83

Event Narrative:

Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at 83%, 73.5% and 99.6% Mwt, respectively. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. While performing SI 4.2.B-5 (Instrumentation that initiates and controls the CSCS Drywell High Pressure), pressure switch 2 PS-64-58D SW#1, as found was 2.64 psig and SW#2 as found was 2.64 psig. The Tech. Spec. required trip is ≤ 2.5 psig. Above this trip setting SW#1 initiates LPCI in conjunction with Low Reactor Pressure, and SW#2 initiates HPCI, and multiplier relay from CSS initiates accident signal. The switches were recalibrated, functionally tested (SI 4.2.B-5) and returned to service. There was no danger to public health or safety. Redundant switches were available and operable. See the attached action plan category 3 for corrective action.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/8148
260/7714
296/8042, 8110, 8212, 8213, 8239, 8312, 8315

Potential Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: *JKP*

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.