

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

V | A | S | P | S | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 58 59

REPORT SOURCE L | E | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 5

50 51 DOCKET NUMBER 52 53 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

1 Type "C" testing (PT-16.4 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage) performed during the
 2 spring of 1983 refueling outage for unit 1 disclosed "as found" leakage exceeding
 3 the allowable leakage rate delineated in T.S.4.4.C. Actual containment leak rate
 4 would have been considerably less than the valve leak rate computed for the test.
 5 Therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

S | D | 11 | X | 12 | Z | 13 | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | X | 15 | X | 16

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

LE/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

8 3 0 1 8 0 3 L 0

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NFRD-4 FOP PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

X | 15 | X | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | L | 24 | A | 25 | X | 9 | 9 | 9 | 25

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 Several valves of various types and sizes leaked excessively due to normal wear from
 2 operational use. All valves that displayed excessive leakage have been repaired or
 3 replaced, and passed retesting.

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | B | 31 | Type C Testing

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | N/A

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

Z | 42 | N/A

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

PUBLICITY (45) 8305100120 830503 PDR ADOCK 05000280 PDR

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

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ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-018/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 04-11-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

1. Description of the Event

Type "C" testing (PT-16.4 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage) performed during the spring of 1983 refueling outage for Unit 1, disclosed "as found" leakage exceeding the allowable leakage as delineated in T.S. 4.4.C. and reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

Total leakage for the test is computed by summing the leak rates of all the valves tested. This very conservative method does not take into consideration two or more isolation valves in series for the same containment penetration. Actual leakage through the penetration would be that of the valve with the smallest leak rate. Therefore, actual containment leak rate would have been considerably less than the valve leak rate computed for the test. Thus, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The major cause of leakage was determined to be deterioration and wear due to normal usage. The Type 'A' Test Report contains the details of the Type 'C' testing.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

As each valve with excessive leakage was identified, maintenance activities were initiated to have the valve repaired.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

Subsequent testing verified all valves to be within specifications. In addition, a Type "A" test has been satisfactorily performed.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J will continue to be adhered to.

7. Generic Implications

None.