

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 | A | L | B | R | F | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CONT

01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During normal operation, while performing SI 4.2.B-6 on unit 2, the drywell

03 | pressure switch 2-PS-64-57A was found to operate at 2.525 psig. Tech. Spec.

04 | Table 3.2.B requires a trip setting of \leq 2.5 psig. There was no danger to

05 | public health or safety. Redundant pressure switches were available and

06 | operable.

07 |

08 |

09 | I | B | 11 | E | 12 | E | 13 | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | S | 15 | Z | 16 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

17 | 8 | 3 | 18 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 20 | L | 21 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 34 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 37 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 39 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 41 | 0 | 42 | 0 | 43 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 47 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 49 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 51 | 0 | 52 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 55 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 57 | 0 | 58 | 0 | 59 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 61 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 63 | 0 | 64 | 0 | 65 | 0 | 66 | 0 | 67 | 0 | 68 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 70 | 0 | 71 | 0 | 72 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 74 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 76 | 0 | 77 | 0 | 78 | 0 | 79 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 81 | 0 | 82 | 0 | 83 | 0 | 84 | 0 | 85 | 0 | 86 | 0 | 87 | 0 | 88 | 0 | 89 | 0 | 90 | 0 | 91 | 0 | 92 | 0 | 93 | 0 | 94 | 0 | 95 | 0 | 96 | 0 | 97 | 0 | 98 | 0 | 99 | 0 | 100 | 0 |

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

18 | E | 19 | X | 20 | Z | 21 | Z | 22 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 34 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 37 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 39 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 41 | 0 | 42 | 0 | 43 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 47 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 49 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 51 | 0 | 52 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 55 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 57 | 0 | 58 | 0 | 59 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 61 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 63 | 0 | 64 | 0 | 65 | 0 | 66 | 0 | 67 | 0 | 68 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 70 | 0 | 71 | 0 | 72 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 74 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 76 | 0 | 77 | 0 | 78 | 0 | 79 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 81 | 0 | 82 | 0 | 83 | 0 | 84 | 0 | 85 | 0 | 86 | 0 | 87 | 0 | 88 | 0 | 89 | 0 | 90 | 0 | 91 | 0 | 92 | 0 | 93 | 0 | 94 | 0 | 95 | 0 | 96 | 0 | 97 | 0 | 98 | 0 | 99 | 0 | 100 | 0 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Pressure switch 2-PS-64-57A had a setpoint drift. The Static-O-Ring switch,

11 | model 12N-AA4 was immediately recalibrated, functionally tested (SI 4.2.B-6),

12 | and returned to service. See the attached action plan category 3 for

13 | corrective action.

14 |

15 | E | 28 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 29 | N/A | 30 | 31 | Surveillance Testing | 32 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 36 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

19 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

20 | N | 44 | N/A | 45 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

21 | N | 44 | N/A | 45 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 8315 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(1) Date Due NRC 5/6/83

Event Narrative:

Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at 83%, 73.5% and 99.6% Mwt, respectively. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. While performing SI 4.2.B-6 (Instrumentation that initiates or controls the CSCS Drywell High Pressure), pressure switch 2 PS-64-57A was found to trip at 2.525 psig. The Tech. Spec. required trip is ≤ 2.5 psig (Table 3.2.B). Above this trip setting 2 PS-64-57A in conjunction with low reactor water level, drywell high pressure, 120 sec delay timer, and a CSS pump or a RHR pump will initiate the ADS. The switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, (SI 4.2.B-6) and returned to service. There was no danger to public health or safety. Redundant switches were available and operable. See the attached action plan category 3 for corrective action.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/8148
260/7714
296/8042, 8110, 8212, 8213, 8239, 8312

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

Revisions: *JRP*

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.