ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system consisting of;

1. One OPERABLE 345 KV transmission line,

2. One OPERABLE 345 KV - 13.8 KV startup transformer, and

3. One OPERABLE 13.8 KV bus, and

b. One diesel generator with:

1. Day fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 4000 gallons of fuel,

2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 32,000 gallons of fuel, and

3. A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until the minimum required A.C. electrical power sources are restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2 except for requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 AND 4.8.1.1.2.a.7.

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Serial No. 938
May 2, 1983

Attachment II

I. Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications Table 4.3-11.

A. Time required to Implement. This change is to be effective upon NRC approval.

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 83-050).

In response to NRC request (Log No. 1184) and committed to by Toledo Edison letter dated March 11, 1983 (Serial No. 895). The output relay contacts in the valve control circuit are not now tested on a monthly basis, but will be incorporated into the monthly channel functional test. Therefore, an amendment request is not required on the output relay contacts as they will be covered under the present Technical Specifications.

C. Safety Evaluation

(See attached)

SAFETY EVALUATION

This amendment request changes the Technical Specification surveillance test requirements section 4.3.2.2.1, Table 4.3-11, the channel functional testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system's automatic actuation logic and manual initiation circuit so that it adequately ensures the system's functional capability to its design standard.

The safety function of the AFW system is to provide feedwater to the steam generators for the removal of reactor decay heat in the absence of main feedwater and to promote natural circulation of the reactor coolant system in the event of a loss of all four reactor coolant pumps. The safety function of the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) is to isolate both steam generators automatically (close the main feedwater valves and main steam line valves and trip the turbine) and start the AFW system upon main steam line or feedwater line rupture or loss of all feedwater. SFRCS also initiates AFW system upon loss of all four RCS pumps.

NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.2. recommends monthly testing of the AFW system's automatic actuation logic and manual initiation circuits (SFRCS). At present, a monthly channel functional test is performed on SFRCS in compliance with NUREG-0737, except the manual actuation buttons are not tested monthly. The reason these buttons are not tested on a monthly basis is that if they were actuated, they would cause a full trip of one channel of SFRCS, which could cause the secondary side of both steam generators to be isolated and one AFW pump would be started.

In Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 SFRCS, all the instrument modules downstream of the manual initiation button are shared with the automatic initiation channels and these modules are required to be functionally tested monthly by Technical Specification Table 4.3-11 item 1, a, b, c and d. Therefore, the proposed change does not affect the current practice of performing the channel functional tests. No change in the existing test procedures is required.

Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change is not an unreviewed safety question.

TABLE 4.3-11

STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
1. Instrument Channel			
a. Steam Line Pressure - Low	S	R	M+
b. Steam Generator Level - Low	S	R	M
c. Steam Generator - Feedwater Differential Pressure-High	S	R	M
d. Reactor Coolant Pumps-Loss of	S	R	M
2. Manual Actuation	NA	NA	~~R~~ M(1)

+The surveillance period for Steam Line Pressure-Low Instrument is extended to 2400 hours, September 16, 1982.

(1) Manual actuation buttons shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manual actuation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days.

Amendment No. 4, 43, 46

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Serial No. 938
May 2, 1983

Attachment III

I. Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications Table 3.6-2.

A. Time required to Implement. This change is to be effective upon NRC approval.

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 83-018).

To cycle the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) in Mode 4 when the pipe is full of steam and not prior to entering Mode 4 (no steam in the pipe) which could score the body bore.

C. Safety Evaluation

(See attached)

SAFETY EVALUATION

This amendment request for changes to the Technical Specifications surveillance testing requirements for the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Table 3.6-2.

The safety function of the MSIVs is to isolate the steam generator in the event of a main steam line break or a loss of feedwater transient to keep the steam generator available as heat sink for the reactor coolant system. The current Technical Specifications requires that these MSIVs be operable during Mode 1, 2, 3 and 4 operations with isolation time as specified. This means that, during plant startup, the surveillance testing of the MSIVs has to be performed prior to entering of Mode 4. Since the reactor, in Mode 4 during startup, is being cooled by the decay heat removal system rather than the steam generator, the operability of MSIVs does not need to be demonstrated until prior to entering Mode 3. The proposed change would allow valve testing to be performed in Mode 4 operation during plant startup when there is sufficient amount of steam in the main steam line to keep the piston rings wet and to avoid damaging the valve bore. This change is only applicable during plant startup and does not degrade the intended safety function of either the MSIVs or the steam generator.

Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change is not an unreviewed safety question.

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
16	RC1719A	Containment Vessel Vent Header	10
16	RC1719B	Containment Vessel Vent Header	10
18 #	SS598	Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample Line	10
19	MU33	Normal RCS Makeup Line	10
19 #	HP2A	High Pressure Injection Line	15
20 #	HP2B	High Pressure Injection Line	15
21	DW6831A	Demineralized Water Supply Line	10
21	DW5831B	Demineralized Water Supply Line	10
22 #	HP2D	High Pressure Injection Line	15
25	CS1531	Containment Spray Line	35
26	CS1530	Containment Spray Line	35
30 #	DH9A	Containment Sump Emergency Recirc Line	71
31 #	DH9B	Containment Sump Emergency Recirc Line	71
32	RC1773A	RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank	10
32	RC1773B	RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank	10
37 #	FW601	Main Feedwater Line	15
38 #	FW612	Main Feedwater Line	15
** 39 #	MS100	Main Steam Line	5
**39 #	ICS11A	Main Steam Line	10
39 #	MS375	Main Steam Line	10
39 #	MS100-1	Main Steam Line	10
** 40 #	MS101	Main Steam Line	5
**40 #	ICS11B	Main Steam Line	10
40 #	MS394	Main Steam Line	10
40 #	MS101-1	Main Steam Line	10

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME
49	DH87	Refueling Canal Fill Line	N/A
49	DH88	Refueling Canal Fill Line	N/A
50 #	HP48	High Pressure Injection	N/A
52	MU242	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
53	MU243	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
54	MU244	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
55	MU245	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
*57 #	MS603	Steam Generator Drain Line	N/A
*57 #	MS603A	Steam Generator Drain Line	N/A
*58 #	MS611	Steam Generator Drain Line	N/A
*58 #	MS611A	Steam Generator Drain Line	N/A
59	Flange	Secondary Side Cleaning (Inside Containment)	N/A
59	Flange	Secondary Side Cleaning (Outside Containment)	N/A
67	CV209	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	N/A
69	CV210	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	N/A
71A #	CV2000B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
71C	CF16	Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Fill Line	N/A
72A #	CV2001B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
72C #	CV624B	Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter	N/A
73A #	CV2002B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
73C #	CV645B	Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter	N/A
74A #	CV2003B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
*74C	DH2735	Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray	N/A
*74C	DH2736	Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray	N/A

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

#Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

**Surveillance testing not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering Mode 3.

##Provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the valve is in the closed positions and deactivated.