

*Southern California Edison Company*

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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**SCE**

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H. B. RAY  
STATION MANAGER

April 18, 1983

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region V  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
14-Day Follow-Up Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 83-026  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Reference: Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to J. B. Martin (NRC)  
dated April 6, 1983

The referenced letter provided you with confirmation of our prompt notification pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-10 for San Onofre Unit 2 involving containment isolation valves.

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12.b, this submittal provides the required 14-day follow-up report and a copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) 83-026 to address this event.

On April 4, 1983 at 1345 while Unit 2 was in Mode 3, a one-inch Containment Isolation Valve 2HV8248 (Main Steam Relief Header Trap Isolation Valve) was declared inoperable. The Action Statement associated with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, requires, among other things, the maintenance of at least one operable isolation valve in each penetration. Since there is no other isolation valve in the penetration associated with 2HV8248, the Action Statement could not be satisfied, LCO 3.0.3. was invoked at 1440 and cooldown was initiated.

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Mr. J. B. Martin

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The valve was repaired and after successfully completing the surveillance test, was declared operable at 1710 at which time the cooldown was terminated. The referenced letter indicated, in error, that the cooldown was terminated at 1600.


A similar problem with this valve was encountered on March 30, 1983 with Unit 2 in Mode 4. Although the valve was initially considered to be inoperable based on indicated mid-position, it was subsequently determined to be a problem of position indication only and the valve was considered operable when closed. Based on further review on March 31, 1983, the valve was considered inoperable based on inoperable position indication. Action was initiated at 1210 to cooldown to Mode 5 pursuant to the Action Statement associated with LCO 3.6.3 and that cooldown reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. Cooldown to Mode 5 was achieved at 0025 on April 1, 1983. Although action was taken consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.0.3, no separate report pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b was made.

Two additional prior occasions (October 10, 1982, involving 2HV8248 on Unit 2 as reported in LER 82-126; and January 18, 1983, involving MSIV-3HV8204 and Main Steam Trap Isolation Valves 3HV8248 and 3HV8249 on Unit 3, not previously reported) did not result in plant cooldown since the valves were considered operable when placed in a closed position.

The enclosed LER 83-026 addresses the event of April 4, 1983. The cause description and corrective actions apply to all of these failures.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER 83-026

April 18, 1983

cc: A.E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)  
R.J. Pate (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Management Information and Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)