



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

March 30, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-069/03X-1
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for
Reportable Occurrence 82-069/03X-1.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks *Jyz*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADDCK 05000272
S PDR

The Energy People

IE22

Report Number: 82-069/03X-1

Report Date: 03-30-83

Occurrence Date: 08-31-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Emergency Core Cooling System - Centrifugal Charging Pump
No. 12 - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-240.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1100 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0930 hours, August 31, 1982, during routine operation, the primary equipment operator discovered a service water leak on No. 12 Centrifugal Charging Pump lube oil cooler outlet piping. No. 12 Centrifugal Charging Pump was declared inoperable and Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Statements 3.5.2a and 3.1.2.4 were entered at 0935 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this occurrence was erosion of the piping by silt laden service water.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling will be available in the event of a loss of coolant accident, assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures to within acceptable limits. The operability of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by reactor coolant system cooldown.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

A minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one system inoperable. The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide the required shutdown margin from all operating conditions. Redundant cooling and boron injection capability is provided by the other charging pump, the accumulators, and the safety injection pumps. Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Action Statement 3.5.2a requires:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Action Statement 3.1.2.4 requires:

With only one charging pump operable, restore at least two charging pumps to operable status within 72 hours, or be in at least hot standby and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to at least 1% Delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to operable status within the next 7 days or be in cold shutdown within the next 30 hours.

Inoperability of No. 12 charging pump, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode as permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The leaking length of service water pipe was replaced and tested satisfactorily. No. 12 Centrifugal Charging Pump was declared operable and Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Statements 3.5.2a and 3.1.2.4 were terminated at 1722 hours, August 31, 1982. Design Change Package (DCP) LSC-0743 has since been implemented. This DCP replaced the charging pump service water piping with piping made of type 316 stainless steel for greater erosion resistance.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Heller



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-40