



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

March 30, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-039/03X-1
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for
Reportable Occurrence 82-039/03X-1.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks *952*

CC: Distribution

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The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-039/03X-1
Report Date: 03-30-83
Occurrence Date: 06-08-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Primary Containment - Missed Surveillance.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-144.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1330 hours, June 8, 1982, a review of Surveillance Procedure SP(O)4.6.1.1A1 by the Shift Technical Advisor revealed several valves which were missing from the procedure; the review was prompted by a recent incident of a similar nature at Salem Generating Station Unit 2. The valves were of a type required to be tested in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1. The valves were immediately checked; all were found to be in the closed position, and they were locked and tagged as found. A review of valve lineups in the appropriate operating instructions showed the valves were required to be closed in the modes for which the surveillance was applicable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The valves were apparently omitted from the surveillance due to oversight at the time the procedure was written. The fact that the valves were missing subsequently escaped the attention of individuals performing the tests.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a requires:

In order to demonstrate primary containment integrity, at least once per 31 days all penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions shall be verified closed by valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their positions.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Vents, drains, test connections, etc. which are: 1) one inch nominal pipe diameter or less, 2) located inside containment, and 3) locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, shall be verified closed at least once per 92 days.

The valves were typically isolation valves, in 3/4 inch vents and drains from sections of piping immediately adjacent to containment penetrations, and included Valves 1RH58, 1RH72, and 1RH73.

The omission of the valves from the surveillance resulted in entering Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.1, due to failure to satisfactorily demonstrate containment integrity. As such, the occurrence involved events leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Because the valves had never been included in the surveillance, the time of entry into Action Statement 3.6.1.1 dates back to initial plant operation.

Containment integrity was maintained, however, as shown by the as found valve positions, and results of the study of the operating instructions. Penetrations of the type involved are capped, providing a boundary in addition to the closed valves. Finally, no leakage from the systems involved was observed, substantiating the conclusion that no degradation of the containment boundary occurred. Consequently, the occurrence in no way involved a risk to the health or safety of the general public.

Action Statement 3.6.1.1 requires:

Without primary containment integrity, restore integrity within one hour, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As demonstrated, the primary containment integrity was maintained, in compliance with Action Statement 3.6.1.1. An in-depth review was conducted for all systems that are involved in the establishment of containment integrity. Based on the results of this review, the surveillance procedures used for verifying containment integrity for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 were revised to be consistent with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Heller



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-40