

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	A	L	B	R	F	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35						
LICENSEE CODE										LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE										CAT 58				

CONT

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	0	7	0	3	1	9	8	3	8	0	4	1	5	8	3	9	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE					

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During routine startup operations following a refuel outage while performing

0 3 | S.I. 4.5.E.1.d and e (HPCI Turbine and Pump Flow Test) the HPCI turbine became

0 4 | inoperable due to an erratic flow controller. (T.S. 3.5.E.2) There was no

0 5 | effect on public health and safety. T.S. 3.5.E.2 permits operation for seven

0 6 | days with HPCI inoperable. Redundant systems were available and operable.

0 7 |

0 8 |

0	9	S	F	11	X	12	Z	13	M	E	C	F	14	U	N	15	Z	16	Z	17	8	3	0	0	9	0	3	1	0	26	Y	23	N	24	N	25	T	1	4	7									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47									
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE										COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRO-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Probable cause of the erratic flow controller was trapped air in the hydraulic

1 1 | oil control system. Maintenance work had been performed on the HPCI during

1 2 | the preceeding refuel outage. Upon repeated testing the HPCI performed

1 3 | satisfactorily. No recurrence control is planned.

1 4 |

1	5	C	28	0	1	0	29	NA	30	B	31	Surveillance tests	32
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					

1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE					

1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					

1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER		DESCRIPTION					

1	9	Z	42	NA	43
7	8	9	10	11	12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE		DESCRIPTION			

2	0	N	44	NA	45
7	8	9	10	11	12
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION					

8304220362 830415
PDR ADOCK 05000260
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Randy Widick

PHONE (205) 729-0857

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 /83009 Technical Specification Involved 3.5.E.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2)* Date Due NRC 4-18-83

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were operating normally at 90-percent power and 100-percent power respectively; unit 2 was operating at 10-percent power. Unit 2 was the only unit affected by this event. Unit 2 was in the startup mode at rated temperature and pressure but not on line following a refuel outage.

On March 19, 1983, while performing Surveillance Instruction 4.5.E.1.d and e, HPCI Turbine and Pump Flow Test, the HPCI was inoperative due to an erratic flow controller, (Technical Specification 3.5.E.2). The HPCI governor control system signals, EGM control signals and proper operation of governor valve linkages were checked and found to be operating properly. The EGR actuator and EGM box were replaced as a precautionary measure. The HPCI was retested and the problem persisted. During retesting, the upper gland seal condenser gasket ruptured and the condenser exhaust motor failed. These events were unrelated to the original problem, and both pieces of equipment were subsequently repaired independent of the original failure. Further testing with a Terry turbine representative assisting revealed that the HPCI was operating satisfactorily. The probable cause of the event as expressed by the turbine representative was the possibility of air being trapped within the hydraulic oil systems during the outage rebuild of the HPCI. The air was not being forced out until sufficient pressure could be established. When the turbine speed was established the governor stabilized and responded to control signals.

Redundant systems were operable as required by Technical Specification 3.5.E. The event is considered a random occurrence and no recurrence control is planned.

* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP