

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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April 13, 1983

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Mr. James F. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/83-05. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker / BT*  
Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php  
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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NRC Resident Inspector  
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Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.  
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Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-287/83-05

Report Date: April 13, 1983

Occurrence Date: March 14, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Unit 3 Reactor Building Cooling Train inoperable due to an inoperable valve

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On March 14, 1983 at 1313, the supply valve to the Unit 3 "B" Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) failed to open during an Engineered Safeguards (ES) test. The valve and the RBC train were both declared inoperable, thus placing Unit 3 in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.3.5.c.(2). After several attempts to open the valve proved unsuccessful, the breaker was checked and found tripped.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident was component failure. The main feeder breaker to Valve 3LPSW-566 tripped on overcurrent during monthly testing which involves partially opening the valve by the generation of an Engineered Safeguards (ES) signal. The overcurrent trip setting was found to be at the minimum setpoint, which is general practice after a valve motor has been installed, which will allow the valve to operate. This is done to give the equipment the maximum protection possible.

Analysis of Occurrence: Two independent ES systems, the Reactor Building Spray (RBS) and the Reactor Building Cooling System, are designed to remove heat from the Reactor Building (RB) following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The RBS System alone is capable of limiting the containment pressure, after a LOCA, below the RB design pressure. A failure of 3LPSW-566 to open after a LOCA would only make the "B" RBCU inoperable. The "A" and "C" RBCUs would still be available to remove heat. The health and safety of the public were not compromised.

Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action involved having the main feeder breaker to the valve motor operator reset, and the valve successfully tested. Later, the valve motor operator was verified to be working properly. The overcurrent trip setting on the breaker was then increased from the minimum. The practice of setting the overcurrent trip setting at the lowest possible value on ES valves will be evaluated.