


LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS
REPORT DATE 4/16/81

CONTROL BLOCK: 

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5				
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58			59

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	2	1	7	0	4	0	5	8	1	8	0	4	1	4	8	3	9
60	61									68	69						74	75						80
DOCKET NUMBER											EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE							

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling/torus modification outage. Unit 2 was operating at rated power. While performing a Unit 1 protective relay breaker trip test procedure, the emergency diesel circuit breakers failed to AUTO close following an LOSP test sequence. The Unit 1 emergency buses remained de-energized until normal power was manually re-stored. An LCO was declared per Unit 2 Tech. Specs. 3.6.6.1. The event is non-repetitive. There were no effects upon public health and safety.

09		SYSTEM CODE EE		11	CAUSE CODE B		12	CAUSE SUBCODE B		13	COMPONENT CODE RELAYX					14	COMP. SUBCODE E		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16	
7	8	9	10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 81		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 026		24	25	OCCURRENCE CODE 01		28	29	REPORT TYPE X		30	REVISION NO. 1		32		
ACTION TAKEN X		18	FUTURE ACTION X		19	EFFECT ON PLANT B		20	SHUTDOWN METHOD A		21	HOURS 0006		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		23	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		24	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A		25
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Cause was traced to undervoltage relays (monitoring the standby offsite
1 1 feeder) failure to deactuate upon loss of power. Relays were checked &
1 2 returned to operable status. The test was reperformed, & the diesel
1 3 breakers AUTO closed successfully. By 2/15/83, new time delay relays had
been installed, tested & the system returned to operable status.

8 9 FACILITY STATUS 1 5 H 28 29 30 OTHER STATUS NA 31 32 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

1 6 2 33 2 34 NA

7 8 9 10 11 44

45 80

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES											
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION							
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA			39

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	41 NA

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

7 8 9 10 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

2 0 N 44 NA 68 69 80
7 8 9 10
H. L. Sumner (912) 367-7851

NAME OF PREPARER _____

PHONE:

(912) 367-7851

000 417.926

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1981-026, Rev. 1

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 14-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b. due to the event's showing that Unit 2 was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. 3.6.6.1.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

This event occurred on 4-5-81, while Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling/torus modification outage and Unit 2 was operating at 2415 MWt (99% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 4-5-81, maintenance procedure "PROTECTIVE RELAY-BREAKER TRIP TEST", HNP-1-6950, was in progress. An offsite power feed trip test sequence was performed as follows:

Normal startup transformer 1D was locked out by tripping its protective relaying. STANDBY STARTUP TRANSFORMER 1C assumed emergency bus loads. 1C was then locked out by tripping its protective relaying. Diesel output breakers 1A, 1B, 1C, did not auto close - thus the emergency busses remained de-energized.

Consequences of the event(s):

The Unit 1 diesel generators were declared inoperable and Unit 2 entered into an LCO per Tech. Specs. 3.6.6.1., ACTION b. The emergency busses remained de-energized until normal startup power was restored.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

Unit 2 diesel generators remained operable and were able to supply power for Unit 2 in case of LOSP occurrence.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation continued under the LCO permitted by Tech. Specs. 3.6.6.1., ACTION b.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event led to Unit 2 entering an LCO per Tech. Specs. 3.6.6.1., ACTION b.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The diesel output breakers failed to auto close because the LOSP lockout relay did not operate. This relay depends upon emergency bus and standby startup transformer 1C feeder undervoltage relay logic. The cause of the LOSP lockout misoperation was traced to two standby startup transformer 1C undervoltage relays, Westinghouse disk induction type CU-7.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The relays were removed from the casings and visually inspected for damage and the presence of metal filings and dirt, then checked for proper operation and returned to an operable status. The test HNP-1-6950 was reperformed and the diesel breakers auto closed successfully.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The relays were checked for disk movement upon loss of potential transformer voltage the next day for both units and found working properly.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

There is no further corrective action necessary.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

After investigation, it was determined that a more reliable system could be obtained by replacing the relay contacts which signaled undervoltage from the 4160 volt emergency buses alternate power supply with time delay contacts. The original circuit required a loss of voltage signal on both the 4160 volt bus and the alternate power supply source to trip the LOSP lockout relay. The new circuit requires only a loss of voltage signal from the 4160 volt emergency bus to trip the LOSP lockout relay. The system logic has changed in that a loss of voltage on the 4160 volt emergency bus sustained for a period greater than the setting of the new time delay relays will indicate that there is a loss of undervoltage on the 1C transformer. The LOSP lockout relays will then be tripped to allow the diesel generators to tie on and energize the 4160 volt emergency buses. The function of the control circuits will remain the same and this change does not affect the operation of any other diesel generator circuit or other safety related circuits. The new time delay relays were tested and successfully implemented into the system by 2/15/83.