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Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


GM-83-323

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Special Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Section 3.7.6.1.b.2.a. of Hatch Unit One Technical
Specifications, please find attached Special Report No.
50-321/1983-004.


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NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR SPECIAL REPORT 50-321/1983-004

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 14-day Special Report is required by Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.a, ACTION b.2.c due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.1.b.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

This event occurred on 3/21/83, with the mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2414 MWt (approximately 99% of full power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 3/21/83, during steady state operations, the cooling tower fire alarm and the fire pump running alarm annunciated in the main control room. Plant personnel were immediately dispatched to investigate the alarm condition. The electric fire pump and both diesel fire pumps were found running and the storage tanks' level decreasing. The fire water storage tanks' level decreased below the requirements specified in Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.13.2.b and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.1.b (i.e., requires greater than 270,000 gallons in each tank).

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation was not affected. Requirements of Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.1, ACTION b.2. were performed. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There are no backup systems.

Justification for continued operation:

The water level in both tanks was restored to greater than 270,000 gallons each within 5 hours and 50 minutes (i.e., the requirements of Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.7.6.1, ACTION b were performed).

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a repetitive event as last reported on Special Report 1-82-004.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other fire protection system. This event is common to Unit 1 and Unit 2.

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Cause(s) of the event(s):

An investigation by plant personnel revealed that the 1B cooling tower deluge system actuated in addition to a main header rupture that caused the fire water storage tanks' level to decrease below Tech. Specs. limits (greater than 270,000 gallons each tank).

Immediate Corrective Action:

The deluge system and the main header for the cooling tower were isolated and the fire water storage tanks' level was restored above 270,000 gallons each.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The deluge system for 1B cooling tower was reset. The main header rupture was isolated and a maintenance request was initiated for repairs on the header.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

Corrective maintenance will be performed on the ruptured header; however, the header has been isolated and indicates no degradation toward the fire water storage tanks nor Tech. Specs. while in this isolated condition.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

At the end of a study that is presently underway, a Design Change will be initiated with the intent of precluding recurrence of the line break in the cooling tower fire protection water system. Additionally, a trend analysis will be performed on all future line breaks of the underground fire protection water systems.