



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Hope Creek Operations

May 1, 1991

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50-354  
UNIT NO. 1  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-006-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Sincerely,

J.J. Hagan  
General Manager -  
Hope Creek Operations

RBC/

Attachment  
SORC Mtg. 91-044

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PDR ADDCK 05000354  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT																				
FACILITY NAME (1) HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION												DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 5 4						PAGE (3) 1 OF 3		
TITLE (4): ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION: REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION WHEN VENTING FLOW TRANSMITTERS DUE TO A DEFICIENT SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE																				
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	**	NUMBER	**	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME(S)						DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0	4	0	5	9	1	9	1	-	0	0	6	-	0	0	0	5	0	1	9	1
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR: (CHECK ONE OR MORE BELOW) (11)																		
		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				XX 50.73(a) (2) (iv)				73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL		20.405(a) (1) (i)				50.36(c) (1)				50.73(a) (2) (v)				73.71(c)						
1		20.405(a) (1) (ii)				50.36(c) (2)				50.73(a) (2) (vii)				OTHER (Specify in						
		20.405(a) (1) (iii)				50.73(a) (2) (i)				50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A)				Abstract below						
//////////		20.405(a) (1) (iv)				50.73(a) (2) (ii)				50.73(a) (2) (viii) (B)				and in Text)						
//////////		20.405(a) (1) (v)				50.73(a) (2) (iii)				50.73(a) (2) (x)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																				
NAME Richard Cowles, Senior Staff Engineer - Technical												TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 9 3 3 9 3 4 3 1								
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (13)																				
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS?	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS?											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED? (14) YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>										DATE EXPECTED (15)										
										MONTH DAY YEAR										
										//////////										

ABSTRACT (16)

On April 5, 1991 at 1113, control room personnel received indication of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System isolation during the course of venting system differential flow transmitters. After ascertaining the initiating cause of the isolation, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS, SRO licensed) directed that the system be restored to a normal alignment. Subsequent investigation determined that the primary cause of this incident was a procedural deficiency, in that the RWCU procedure does not take into account the need for defeating the system isolation logic when venting the differential flow transmitters. Corrective actions consist of implementing a procedure change to require defeating the RWCU system isolation logic when venting system differential flow transmitters, and reviewing this event during licensed operator requalification training.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)							PAGE (3)					
		YEAR	**	NUMBER			**	REV						
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	91	-	0	0	6	-	0	0	0	2	OF	0	3

#### PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)  
Reactor Water Cleanup System (EIIIS Designation: CE)

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation When Venting Flow Transmitters Due To A Deficient System Operating Procedure

Event Date: 4/5/91

Event Time: 1113

This LER was initiated by Incident Report No. 91-057

#### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Plant in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation), Reactor Power 100%, Unit Load 1115MWe.

#### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On April 5, 1991 at 1113, control room personnel received indication of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolation during the course of venting system differential flow transmitters. After ascertaining the initiating cause of the isolation, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS, SRC licensed) directed that the system be restored to a normal alignment. A 4 hour non-emergency report was made IAW 10CFR50.72, as this incident is classified as an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation.

#### APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The primary cause of this occurrence was a procedural deficiency, in that the RWCU system operating procedure does not take into account the need for defeating the system isolation logic when venting differential flow transmitters.

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

On the morning of 4/5/91, the RWCU system was being returned to service following a scheduled system maintenance outage. The "B" RWCU pump was in service, and due to erratic system flow indications, the NSS requested that the shift Controls Technician vent the RWCU differential flow transmitters prior to placing the "A" RWCU pump in service, per procedure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
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HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	91	-	0	0	3	-	0	0	0	3	OF	0	3

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE, CONT'D

While the subject system operating procedure called for venting the differential flow transmitters prior to placing a pump in service (if the pump has been idle), the procedure does not take into account the need for defeating the isolation logic prior to performing the venting. Venting differential flow transmitters when placing the RWCU system in service is a routine evolution, and more experienced control room personnel are aware that the RWCU isolation logic needs to be defeated prior to venting. This requirement, however, was not reflected in the procedure.

#### PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

One previous RWCU isolation occurred due to problems encountered during performance of the warmup portion of the RWCU system operating procedure (Ref: LER 89-001-00). While other RWCU isolations have occurred due to RWCU system high differential flow signals, these occurrences were due to placing the filter demineralizers in service.


#### SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

This incident posed no potential threat to the health and safety of the general public. Had RWCU been inoperable long enough to degrade reactor water chemistry to a Technical Specification limiting condition, plant shutdown would have been required by Technical Specifications.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. A procedure change was implemented to clearly define the requirements for defeating the RWCU system isolation logic when venting system differential flow transmitters with the system in service.
2. This event will be reviewed with all Operations Department personnel during licensed operator requalification training.

Sincerely,

  
J.J. Hagan

General Manager -  
Hope Creek Operations



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
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