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Forked River, New Jersey 08731
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

April 8, 1983

Regional Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-13/01T

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-13/01T in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.6 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219-83-13/01T

Report Date

April 8, 1983

Occurrence Date

March 27, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Both doors of a Reactor Building personnel access airlock were open simultaneously for a period of approximately 30 seconds. This constitutes a degradation of Secondary Containment Integrity as the conditions of Technical Specification 3.5.B.1 were not met.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown for refueling and maintenance. The Mode Switch was in Refuel and the reactor coolant temperature was maintained at 70°F.

Description of Occurrence

On Sunday, March 27, 1983, workers were bringing a CRD guide tube seal tool (approximately 12-15 feet long) from storage into the Reactor Building. The equipment was brought into the building through personnel airlock doors on the 23 foot elevation. Both doors remained open for approximately 30 seconds.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause is being attributed to personnel error.

Analysis of Occurrence

Secondary Containment Integrity is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive material and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the reactor building atmosphere under accident conditions. The ability of Secondary Containment to perform its function with both personnel access airlock doors open was degraded. However, the duration of this occurrence was short and personnel were on hand to close the doors, if necessary.

Corrective Action

Once the equipment was inside the Reactor Building both doors were closed and the Control Room was notified. This incident has been reviewed with the personnel involved and appropriate disciplinary action is being taken.

Failure Data

None