



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

April 6, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-002/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-002/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. J. Midura", with a stylized flourish at the end.

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

FD:ks

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

Report Number: 83-002/03L
Report Date: 04-06-83
Occurrence Date: 03-14-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Code Safety Valves - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-054.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 2PR3, 2PR4, and 2PR5 were tested for lift set pressure and seat leakage by Wyle Laboratories during the period of February 24-25, 1983. All valves lifted below the 2485 psig \pm 1% pressure range specified in Technical Specification 3.4.3. All valves displayed heavy audible and visual seat leakage at 2236 psig. The actual lift pressures were: 2PR3 - 2416 psig (44 psig below), 2PR4 - 2400 psig (60 psig below), 2PR5 - 2454 psig (6 psig below).

Technical Specification 3.4.3 requires:

All pressurizer code safety valves shall be operable with a lift setting of 2485 psig \pm 1%. With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to operable status within 15 minutes or be in hot standby within 12 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the occurrence is presently undetermined. However, the manufacturer has been requested to investigate the cause and report their findings to us.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 pounds per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are operable, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be operable to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated valves or steam dump valves.

This was the first time these valves had been tested since startup, this being the first refueling outage.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


All three valves have been repaired and retested satisfactorily. They are scheduled to be reinstalled.

It is recognized that this incident possibly involved plant performance adverse to the basis of Technical Specification 3.4.3. In order to assess the actual impact of the safety valve test failures on plant performance during the analyzed transient, an engineering evaluation of the occurrence has been requested. A Supplemental Report will be submitted upon completion of the evaluation.

FAILURE DATA:

Crosby Valve and Gage Co.
Pressurizer Safety Valve
Part No. HB-86-BP

Prepared By F. Dickey



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-42B