



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

April 6, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-008/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station  
Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,  
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable  
Occurrence 83-008/03L. This report is required within  
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

FD:ks

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272  
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The Energy People

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Report Number: 83-008/03L  
Report Date: 04-06-83  
Occurrence Date: 03-11-83  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Code Safety Valves - Inoperable

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-052.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 1PR3, 1PR4, and 1PR5 were tested for lift set pressure and seat leakage by Wyle Laboratories during the period of November 2-13, 1982. All valves lifted in excess of the 2485 psig  $\pm$  1% pressure range specified in Technical Specification 3.4.2.2. Also, all valves exhibited heavy seat leakage. The actual lift pressures were: 1PR3 - 2564 psig (54 psig over), 1PR4 - 2532 psig (22 psig over), 1PR5 - 2546 psig (36 psig over).

Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 requires:

All pressurizer code safety valves shall be operable with a lift setting of 2485 psig  $\pm$  1%. With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to operable status within 15 minutes or be in hot standby within 12 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the occurrence is presently undetermined. However, the manufacturer has been requested to investigate the cause and report their findings to us.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 pounds per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are operable, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be operable to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

These valves had been tested, repaired, and retested during the first refueling outage in 1979. They were within specification when reinstalled.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


All three valves were repaired and retested satisfactorily, then reinstalled.

It is recognized that this incident possibly involved operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the basis of Technical Specification 3.4.2. In order to assess the actual impact of the safety valve test failures on plant performance during the analyzed transient, an engineering evaluation of the occurrence has been requested. A Supplemental Report will be submitted upon completion of the evaluation.

FAILURE DATA:

Crosby Valve and Gage Co.  
Pressurizer Safety Valve  
Part No. HB-86-BP

Prepared By F. Dickey

  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-42B