NRC FORM 366 (12-81) 10 CFR 50

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: P A S E S 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 3 2 2 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 4 0 5 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While in Operating Condition 3, Hot Shutdown, preparing for startup and having
0 3 just finished a SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME SURVEILLANCE, the reactor mode switch was
0 4 turned from "startup" to "shutdown" position and only a ½ SCRAM was actuated. All
0 5 control rods were checked and determined to be full in. I&C group investigated the
0 6 problem and then a full SCRAM was initiated by the manual SCRAM pushbuttons. There
0 7 were no consequential effects to the public health and safety.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	I A (11)	E (12)	X (13)	C K T B R K (14)	E (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 4 3	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
A (18)	X (19)	C (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	G 1 9 5

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The reactor mode switch exhibited intermittent operation of two of its contacts.
1 1 The switch was replaced. The operating procedure has been changed and now requires
1 2 the operator to push the manual SCRAM pushbuttons in conjunction with turning the
1 3 mode switch to shutdown. The switch functions are verified after each use and the
1 4 failed switch is to be sent for testing and analysis.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	C (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	A (31)	Operator observation

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

8304180229 830405
PDR ADOCK 05000387
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	Y (44)	Television, Radio, Newspaper release - 3/22/83	

NAME OF PREPARER Jon T. Todd PHONE: (717)542-2181 X3524

Attachment

Licensee Event Report 83-043/01T-0

While the reactor was in Hot Shutdown, a pre-startup surveillance on the SCRAM Discharge Volume was in progress. Upon completion of the surveillance, the reactor mode switch was turned from the "startup" position to the "shutdown" position. Instead a full SCRAM coming in, only a one-half SCRAM was received. Immediately all control rods were checked and determined to be full in. The I&C group was called to investigate the problem and identified the mode switch as the source. The reactor was then manually scrammed by the pushbuttons and a full Reactor Protection System actuation was indicated.

The mode switch was tried several more times and operated intermittently. The switch was removed and the NSSS supplier (General Electric) was contacted to send a replacement. A replacement was shipped to the site and bench tested. As the switch was tested (contact continuity) it was also determined to be unacceptable. The switch was returned to the NSSS supplier and PP&L has been informed that they are performing a failure analysis (the ownership of the switch was never transferred from General Electric to PP&L). The NSSS supplier shipped four more mode switches to the site and they successfully passed a bench test.

The mode switch was replaced with one of the acceptable switches. The operating procedure has been revised to require the operator to push the manual scram pushbuttons in conjunction with turning the mode switch to the shutdown position. The original, replaced mode switch is to be sent out for failure analysis. In the interim, the electrical work group is being notified by Operation's each time the mode switch position is changed and they are verifying proper contact alignment. This verification is required prior to pulling rods, increasing recirculation pump flow or increasing power.

PP&L feels that the results of the switch failure analysis are required before a 10 CFR 21 report decision can be made. An investigation is in progress to determine 10 CFR 50.55e reporting requirements for Unit 2.

This LER will be updated.