



Commonwealth Edison
1400 Onus Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

April 24, 1991

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2
Supplemental Response to
NRC Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 3
TAC Nos. M69602, M69603
NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455

Reference: (a) NRC Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 3,
dated April 11, 1989.

(b) M. Richter letter to U.S. NRC,
dated July 17, 1989.

(c) M. Richter letter to U.S. NRC,
dated November 29, 1989.

Dear Sir:

Reference (a) described an event at a foreign reactor facility (Genkai) which raised new concerns on thermal stratification in unisolable piping connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The event in Reference (a) occurred due to a valve leakage phenomenon which was not previously considered in NRC Bulletin 38-08 (or Supplements 1 and 2). Reference (a) requested that the Actions in NRC Bulletin 88-08 Supplement 3 be addressed.

As reported in Reference (b), Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) identified two (2) lines associated with the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System per unit at Braidwood Station which may be susceptible to cyclic stratification due to the valve leakage phenomenon described in Reference (a). To address Bulletin Actions 2 and 3 for Braidwood Station, Edison indicated that an evaluation was being performed which would supply the critical locations on the susceptible piping for inspection purposes, and the frequency of future inspections to ensure piping integrity. Reference (c) provided the results of that evaluation for Braidwood Station. Reference (c) also indicated Braidwood Station would be performing non-destructive examinations on the susceptible RHR suction lines at the critical locations determined from that evaluation. Additionally, Reference (c) indicated Braidwood Station would adopt a long-term inspection program to ensure the integrity of the RHR suction lines.

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As indicated in Reference (c), during the Fall 1989 refueling outage for Braidwood Unit 1 non-destructive examinations were performed on the four (4) welds which were identified by the evaluation as critical locations. The welds examined were 1RC-11-7, 1RC-11-8 and 1RC-11-9 on line 1RC04AB and weld 1SI-02-43 on line 1RC04AA. The examinations of the welds and associated heat affected zones were performed utilizing enhanced ultrasonic techniques which ensure increased sensitivity for the detection of cracks. The results of these examinations for Braidwood Unit 1 revealed that there were no indications found. The inspections performed fulfill Bulletin Action 2 for Braidwood Unit 1.

During the Spring 1990 refueling outage for Braidwood Unit 2 non-destructive examinations were performed on the four (4) welds which were identified by the evaluation as critical locations. The welds examined were 2RC-11-7, 2RC-11-8 and 2RC-11-9 on line 2RC04AB and weld 2SI-02-44 on line 2RC04AA. The examinations of the welds and associated heat affected zones were performed utilizing enhanced ultrasonic techniques which ensure increased sensitivity for the detection of cracks. The results of these examinations for Braidwood Unit 2 revealed that there were no indications found. The inspections performed fulfill Bulletin Action 2 for Braidwood Unit 2.

The Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program at Braidwood has been revised to include the inspection of these lines (at the critical locations) at a frequency of every other refueling outage.

This letter therefore completes the reporting requirements and action items identified in Bulletin 88-08 Supplement 3 for Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2.

Please direct any questions that you may have on this response to this office.

Respectfully,



D.L. Taylor
Generic Issues Administrator

DT:lmw
ZNLD806/24

cc: A.B. Davis - Regional Administrator, Region III
R. Pulsifer - Project Manager, NRR
Resident Inspector - Braidwood