



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

September 23, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 -
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-12

The enclosed special report provides details concerning several fire barrier penetrations that have been intentionally removed from service to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage activities. The fire protection components will be inoperable for periods greater than the TS allowable timeframes. The enclosure contains details of the conditions for each component.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell

R. H. Shell
Manager
SQN Site Licensing

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

280033

IE22
11

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 2

September 23, 1994

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-12

I. PENETRATIONS

1. Mark No. 60A, Q-line Wall Penetration at A-13 (Elevation 701.0)
2. Mark No. 1731, A-13 Column Wall Penetration Between S and T Lines (Elevation 719 feet 7 inches)
3. Mark No. 869, Floor Penetration (Elevation 714.0) East of S-line on A-14 Column

Description of Condition

With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 refueling outage (RFO), the penetrations noted above were breached to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 (U2C6) RFO activities. These penetrations will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The penetrations were breached to support the modification to replace the carbon steel hydrazine tubing, piping, and valves with stainless steel components.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of each of the penetrations were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breaches are removed and the fire barriers are reestablished at the end of the U2C6 RFO.

II. PENETRATION 048-0-1

Description of Condition

With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RFO, the penetration's fire barrier was breached to support the U2C6 RFO maintenance activities. The penetration is located in the auxiliary building on Elevation 669.0 in Unit 2 Pipe Gallery Room A-25 (penetration room). The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The penetration contains a reach rod for a chemical and volume control system valve. The reach rod used to operate the valve from outside the penetration room has been damaged and is being replaced.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished.