

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[illegible]

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES TO  
On 3/8/83, while in Mode 1 at 100% full power, an inadvertant actuation of the Containment Spray Actuation  
System (CSAS) occurred. The monthly test for Channel 'B' Plant Protective System (PPS) was in progress at the  
time of the occurrence. The sodium hydroxide outlet valve (2CV-5657-1), the 'A' spray header control valve  
(2CV-5612-1) and the 'A' containment spray pump (2P-35A) were actuated to their CSAS positions. The time  
duration from 2CV-5612-1 starting open to terminating the event by putting 2P-35A into "pull-to-lock" was  
11 minute and 23 seconds. Since 2P-35A was rendered inoperable when placed in "pull-to-lock" for 2 minutes and  
14 seconds when terminating the inadvertant actuation, this occurrence is reportable per Technical (continued)

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0	9	5	8	E	12	A	13	R	E	L	A
7	8	9	10	11		12		13		14	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO	
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
21	22	23		24		25		26		27	

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRO-4 FORM SUB	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
1 A 18	1 Z 19	1 Z 20	1 Z 21	1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 22	1 Y 23	1 Y 24	1 N 25	1 T 1 0 1 8 1 3 26
33	34	35	36	37 40	41	42	43	44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27	
1   0	Immediate actions were to verify inadvertent actuation had occurred, to place 2P-35A into "pull-to-lock" to
1   1	stop CSAS, and to reset the PPS. Troubleshooting revealed that the K1523 relay which controls trip path 2 or 4
1   2	in CSAS was defective. Relays in PPS channels 'B' and 'D' were checked during the troubleshooting efforts.
1   3	The K1523 relay (Teledyne P/N 603-10001) was replaced. The applicable section of the surveillance test was
1   4	performed several times to ensure that the relay would operate satisfactorily. Additionally, a (continued)

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	1	0	0	29	1	8	31	32
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80
E 128				NA		30		Surveillance Testing	

ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	6	2	34	NA	35	NA	36
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	46

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER				TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	1	7		0	0	0	37	2	38	NA
7	7	8		9	0	0	11	12	13	

PERSONNEL INJURIES									
NUMBER					DESCRIPTION				
1	1	8	0	0	0	40	NA		
7	8	9	10	11	12				

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		8304150192 830331
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	PDR ADOCK 05000368
1 9	7 42 NA	S PDR

PUBLICITY									
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16

NAME OF PREPARER Patrick Rogers

PHONE: (501)964-3100

LER NO. 50-368/83-015/03L-0

Occurrence Date: 3/8/83

Event Description and Probable Consequences (Continued)

Specification 6.9.1.9.b. The redundant spray pump (2P-35B) and its associated train were operable. This occurrence is similar to LER (50-368) 80-024. Approximately 2450 gallons of borated water were sprayed into the containment building during this occurrence.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

visual inspection of the containment building indicated no apparent effects from the spray actuation.