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April 8, 1983

Docket No. 50-423
AEC-MP3-310
B10753

Mr. James M. Allan
Deputy Regional Administrator
Region 1
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

- References:
- (1) W. G. Counsil letter to USNRC, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design and Construction, dated April 15, 1980.
 - (2) W. G. Counsil letter to R. C. Haynes, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design and Construction: Cracking of Control Rod Guide Tube Support Pins (SD-6), dated September 3, 1982.
 - (3) W. G. Counsil letter to R. C. Haynes, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design and Construction: Cracking of Control Rod Guide Tube Support Pins (SD-6), dated October 12, 1982.

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies
in Design and Construction: Final Report,
Cracking of Control Rod Guide Tube Support Pins (SD-6)

Gentlemen:

In Reference (1) Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) reported a potential significant deficiency concerning cracking of control rod guide tube support pins as required by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Paragraph 55(e). In that letter, we also committed to inform you at a later date of what corrective and preventive actions were being taken. Reference (2) provided you with an update and a commitment to provide further information. Reference (3) provided an update and a further commitment for an update.

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Westinghouse has completed a detailed engineering evaluation of control and guide tube support pin failures, including metallurgical analyses of pins removed from North Anna 1. This evaluation has verified that the pins cracked due to stress corrosion. Westinghouse has concluded that cracked or broken guide tube support pins do not constitute a safety concern. However, because of the potential for loose parts impacting other components (e.g. steam generator tube sheets), Westinghouse has recommended that the support pins in Millstone Unit No. 3 be replaced with a later design before plant startup.


Following Westinghouse's recommendation, NNECO has replaced all of the control rod guide tube support pins with pins of the new design. The upgraded pins utilize material heat-treated at 2000°F, which has been found to provide additional margin against stress corrosion cracking. Several design modifications have been incorporated to reduce the potential for stresses.

By incorporating this new pin design, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company considers the reported significant deficiency to be resolved.

This letter constitutes our final report closing out all items related to SD-6. We trust the above information satisfactorily responds to your concerns.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



W. G. Council
Senior Vice President