

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 55 56

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 3 0 7 8 3 8 0 4 0 4 8 3 5  
 DOCKET NUMBER 58 59 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

On March 7, 1983 with fuel movement in progress, 1-GN-3 (nitrogen purge to 'C' stm. Gen) was removed which resulted in an unisolated path from the containment to the outside atmosphere and thus a violation of refueling containment integrity. This is contrary to T.S.-3.10.A.1 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2). A CAT I filtering system was maintaining a negative pressure in the containment. The pathway was isolated upon discovery, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE H B 11 CAUSE CODE D 12 CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13 COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14 COMP. SUBCODE E 15 VALVE SUBCODE D 16  
 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 8 3 EVENT YEAR 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 25 0 1 5 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 28 0 3 REPORT TYPE 30 L REVISION NO. 32 0  
 ACTION TAKEN 33 X 18 FUTURE ACTION 34 G 19 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 Z 21 HOURS 37 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41 Y 23 NPD-4 FORM SUB. 42 N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 V 1 3 9 25

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

When repair activities were initiated, the plant was not in a Refueling Shutdown condition. Repair activities were delayed waiting an engineering study for valve replacement. When repair activities were reinitiated the plant mode had changed, i.e. fuel movement. Upon discovery of the violation, the open ended pipe was capped.

FACILITY STATUS 28 H 29 0 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS 30 N/A METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 A 32 Maintenance activities

ACTIVITY CONTENT 33 Z 34 Z 35 N/A AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 37 0 0 0 38 Z 39 N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES 40 0 0 0 41 N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 42 Z 43 N/A

PUBLICITY 44 N 45 8304130297 830404 PDR ADDCK 05000280 S PDR

ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 N 46

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1  
DOCKET NO: 50-280  
REPORT NO: 83-015/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 03-07-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: LOSS OF REFUELING INTEGRITY

1. Description of the Event

While Unit 1 refueling operations were in progress, 1-GN-3, a 2" valve in the nitrogen purge line to "C" steam generator, was removed for maintenance purposes. "C" steam generator secondary hand hole covers had been removed to facilitate sludge lancing operations. Thus, the removal resulted in an unisolated path from containment atmosphere, through the steam generator and 2" nitrogen purge line, to the Main Steam Valve House atmosphere. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.10.A.1 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

During refueling operations, containment atmosphere is exhausted through the CAT I filters. Since capacity of the containment exhaust fans is greater than the supply fans, a negative pressure results in containment, and any small leakage is into containment. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

3. Cause:

At the time operations personnel authorized the work to be performed, plant conditions were such that repair or replacement of the valve was permissible. When maintenance personnel examined the valve, they determined that it could not be repaired and it had to be replaced. An engineering study was performed to facilitate valve replacement, and commencement of work was delayed. During this time period, refueling operations were initiated and the "C" steam generator hand hole covers were removed. Thus, when the valve was removed, a direct path opened from the Main Steam Valve House atmosphere to containment atmosphere.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

Fuel movement was stopped and the 2" opening was temporarily sealed with a plastic pipe cap and tape. Subsequently, refueling operations were terminated while the new valve was welded in place.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The refueling containment integrity checklist has been reviewed and as result improved guidance, for the identification of indirect paths to the containment atmosphere, will be included.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The action taken in section 5 above should preclude recurrence of this event.

7. Generic Implications

None.