

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

April 7, 1983

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA REGION  
83 APR 8 9:59

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 83-022

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-022 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, "Fire Protection Instrumentation," on March 8, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/dwf/fjc  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	G. J. Braddick
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#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 1400 hours on March 8, 1983, with the plant in Mode 1, Operations personnel were notified that a conduit had been cut during core drilling operations for a plant modification. The circuitry contained within the conduit was not immediately identified since the conduit was embedded in fire proofing material. At 1500 hours, the circuitry was identified by plant personnel as smoke detector zones JJ, Elevation 412', Room 12-02 (East Penetration Access Area) and FF, Elevation 423'-6", Room 236-01 (Intermediate Building). A fire watch patrol of the affected zones was established within one (1) hour of the failure determination in accordance with Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7. The hourly fire watch patrol minimized the possibility of a fire being undetected in the subject zones until repairs could be performed.

#### CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The personnel performing the core drilling had checked both sides of the floor for obstructions prior to starting their work but failed to see the conduit embedded in the fire proofing material. The conduit/wiring was replaced, and the smoke detectors returned to operable status by 1130 hours on March 22, 1983. The return to operable status was made after the completion of a satisfactory Operational Test performed with the appropriate surveillance test procedure.

The procedure used for core drilling is in the process of being revised to include probing for hidden interferences through the fire proofing material at the core drill location. The procedure revision is expected to be complete by April 30, 1983, and should prevent any future recurrence.