

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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March 25, 1983

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NRC RESIDENT  
INTEL DEPT

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/83-02. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. My letter of March 11, 1983 addressed the delay in preparation of this report.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker / BT*

Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php  
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. J. C. Bryant  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Oconee Nuclear Station

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Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-287/83-02

Report Date: March 25, 1983

Occurrence Date: February 25, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure to meet Technical Specification requirements during Reactor Protection System Pump Power Monitor Tests.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On February 25, 1983, engineering evaluation revealed that certain test procedures required a condition that was in violation of Technical Specification Table 3.5.1-1, Part 9, Note (h). During the performance of the procedures for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) channels' pump power monitor instrument calibration that day, a channel was made inoperable but was not tripped as required by the Technical Specification table note. While testing all RPS pump power monitor channels, channel 3 began to perform erratically. Before continuing, the conditions for operability were discussed, and through evaluation, it was discovered that the test procedures indeed allow for only three channels to be operable during testing but omit the requirement of Note (h) to have the fourth channel in the tripped state.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was a deficiency in procedure. The station procedure did not include the stipulation that the fourth channel be in the tripped state as required by Technical Specification Table 3.5.1-1, Part 9, Note (h). When Note (h) was added to the Technical Specification in 1981, the approval/review system was flawed in that it allowed this change to be incorporated into the Specifications without incorporation into the affected procedures.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the testing, if the pump in the inoperable channel and one other pump had been lost, the reactor would have tripped on flux/flow imbalance. Other RPS parameters which were operable that would have tripped the reactor as a result of loss of coolant pumps are Pressure-Temperature Trip and Reactor Coolant Pressure Trip. Hence, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action: For the immediate corrective action, the channel was tripped to comply with the Technical Specifications. The watt transducer was replaced to correct the problem with the channel. October 26, 1982, a change was made to a station directive to require that the responsible sections affected by a Technical Specification change provide a written response to the Station Licensing Engineer. The response will describe how the section will implement the Technical Specification change. This is to ensure that the intent of the Technical Specification changes is met, and has corrected the flaw that previously allowed for the existence of the inadequate procedures that caused this occurrence.

For changes affecting the Instrumentation and Electrical (I&E) Support Engineers, NRC approved changes will be checked by the engineer responsible for the system affected by the change. Previously, the engineer responsible for the system affected would check the proposed change and make comments and changes of procedures. The engineer responsible for Technical Specification change coordination within the I&E support section would make comments about the approved Technical Specification change.

I&E procedures will be changed to trip the channel being tested as required by Technical Specifications.