

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

March 31, 1983

NRG REGION  
ANTHONY  
83 APR 8 4 59

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 83-020

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-020 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, "Fire Detection Instrumentation," on March 5, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

ARK:OWD/dwf  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer  
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
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#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 1815 hours on March 5, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 1, an indication of trouble with Integrated Fire and Security System (IFS) Remote Indication Acquisition Cabinet (RIAC) #12 was received in the Main Control Room. RIAC #12 provides actuation alarms to the Main Control Room IFS panel for smoke detectors in Intermediate Building zones AA, BB, and CC, and for heat detectors in Diesel Generator Building zones DG (427) and DG (436). The sprinkler systems associated with these detectors remained operable.

There were no adverse consequences since a fire watch patrol was implemented in compliance with Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, thereby, establishing fire detection capability in the affected zones.

#### CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Investigation into the cause of the event revealed a blown fuse on instrument card ER-6. The blown fuse was replaced, and RIAC #12 was returned to operable status at 1945 hours on March 5, 1983.

No further corrective actions are deemed necessary.