

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	---

  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	2	1	7	0	2	2	2	8	3	6	0	3	2	4	8	3	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

While performing the "HPCI PUMP OPERABILITY" procedure, plant personnel declared HPCI inoperable when the HPCI turbine exhaust diaphragms ruptured. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.D.1.a. The unit was placed in a 14-day LCO. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

0	9	S	F	A	C	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Z	Z
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17	8	3	0	1	3	0	3	L	0	0	0	0	Y	N	N	Z	9	9	9
----	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

  
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error. The HPCI drain pot drain valve was repaired and new turbine exhaust diaphragms were installed on the HPCI turbine exhaust line. The turbine was satisfactorily tested and returned to operable status. The responsible personnel have been counseled concerning these events.

1	5	C	0	3	0	NA	B	Surveillance Test
---	---	---	---	---	---	----	---	-------------------

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1	6	Z	Z	NA	NA	NA
---	---	---	---	----	----	----

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1	7	0	0	0	Z	NA
---	---	---	---	---	---	----

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1	8	0	0	0		NA
---	---	---	---	---	--	----

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1	9	Z		NA
---	---	---	--	----

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

2	0	N		NA
---	---	---	--	----

  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-321/1983-013

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.D.1.a.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The event occurred on 2/22/83 with reactor power at 724 MWt (30 percent power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 2/22/83, while performing the "HPCI PUMP OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-1-3303), plant personnel declared HPCI inoperable when the HPCI turbine exhaust diaphragms ruptured (reference Deviation Report 1-83-047).

Consequences of the event(s):

Unit 1 was placed in a 14-day LCO as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.D.2. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

The following redundant systems as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.D.2 were operable: ADS, Core Spray, RHR (LPCI Mode), and RCIC.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation continued as permitted per Tech. Specs. section 3.5.D.2.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

The event had no effect on other Unit 1 systems or on Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of the event (reference Deviation Report 1-83-047) has been attributed to personnel error. Maintenance had been previously performed on the HPCI exhaust drainpot drain valve (E41-F053) prior to the event. That repair was not completed due to the unavailability of spare parts; however, the drain valve was inadvertently returned to service. Due to this incomplete repair, the E41-F053 poppet was not attached to the valve stem; this caused the E41-F053 valve to not function properly. Condensate which accumulated in the turbine exhaust was prevented from draining to the barometric condenser when HPCI was in standby condition. When the HPCI turbine started, this condensate was discharged down the exhaust line, and the weight of the condensate perforated the exhaust diaphragms which immediately ruptured.

Immediate Corrective Action:

Valve E41-F053 was repaired and new turbine exhaust diaphragms (i.e., vacuum supports and rupture discs) were installed on the HPCI turbine exhaust line. The HPCI turbine was satisfactorily tested per HNP-1-3303 and returned to operable status on 2/25/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The responsible personnel have been counseled concerning the circumstances which led to these events.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No scheduled (future) corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

The immediate and supplemental corrective actions are all that are necessary to prevent recurrence of this event.