

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	0	H	D	B	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33											
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE										CAT		58	

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	4	6	7	0	3	0	4	8	3	8	0	3	3	1	8	3	9							
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33							
CON'T		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(NP-33-83-17) On 3/4/83 at 0305 hours, chlorine detector AE5358B tripped causing a shutdown of the Control Room normal ventilation system. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7. Per the action statement requirements, the Control Room ventilation system was placed in the recirculation mode. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The redundant chlorine detector was operable during the time of this occurrence.

0	9	P	C	11	E	12	X	13	I	N	S	T	R	U	14	E	15	Z	16	8	3	0	1	3	0	3	L	0	8	3	2	A	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	Y	24	Z	25	Z	9	9	9	26
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50											
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE								COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER										

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause was a component failure. The orifice had plugged on the detector and the wick had dried. Under generic Work Order 83-8583, Instrument and Control personnel cleaned the orifice, replaced the wick, and checked operation per the Chlorine Detector System Monthly Test ST 5037.02. At 0440 hours on 3/4/83, the detector was declared operable, removing the unit from the action statement.

1	5	E	28	0	9	9	29	NA	30	A	31	Operator observation	32	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36	37	Z	38	NA	39	40	NA	41	42	NA	43	44	NA	45	46	47	48	49	50				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		ACTIVITY CONTENT		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE		PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		PERSONNEL INJURIES		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		PUBLICITY		ISSUED DESCRIPTION		NAME OF PREPARER		PHONE		DVR		NRC USE ONLY											

DVR 83-030

NAME OF PREPARER

Linda Makatura

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-17

DATE OF EVENT: March 4, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Chlorine detector AE5358B tripped due to a component malfunction.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2739 and Load (Gross MWE) = 917.

Description of Occurrence: On March 4, 1983, at 0305 hours, chlorine detector AE5358B tripped causing a shutdown of the Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HV&AC) System. The plant entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7. The Control Room HV&AC System was placed in the recirculation mode within one hour, and the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) Unit 2 was started to limit Control Room temperature rise.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The detector trip was attributed to a component malfunction. The orifice had plugged on the detector and the wick dried, resulting in a trip.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The detector failed in the safe direction causing the shutdown of the Control Room normal ventilation system. In addition, the redundant detector, AE5358A, was operable throughout this occurrence.

Corrective Action: On March 4, 1983, under generic Work Order 83-8583, Instrument and Control personnel cleaned the orifice, replaced the wick, and checked operation per the Chlorine Detector System Monthly Surveillance Test ST 5037.02. The detector was declared operable at 0440 hours on March 4, 1983, and the Control Room HV&AC system was returned to the normal mode. This corrective action removed the plant from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

Presently, a preventative maintenance program is performed three times a week on the chlorine detectors. This program verifies that the drip rate of the electrolyte solution is adequate to prevent the orifice from plugging and that a sufficient amount of electrolyte solution is available for proper operation. This program will also be upgraded to include thoroughly cleaning the detectors every six months.

Failure Data: Previous similar occurrences of detector failures have been reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-81-19 (81-018) and NP-33-82-80 (82-065).