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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 14, 1994
C321-94-2147

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Monthly Operating Report - August, 1994

In accordance with the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Operating License No. DPR-16, Appendix A, Section 6.9.1.C, enclosed are two (2) copies of the Monthly Operating Data (gray book information) for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

If you should have any questions, please contact Brenda DeMerchant, Oyster Creek Licensing Engineer at (609) 971-4642.

Sincerely,

for
J.J. Barton
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

JJB/BDEM: jc
Attachment

cc: Administrator, Region 1
Senior NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager

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SUMMARY

AUGUST, 1994

Oyster Creek entered August at very slightly reduced load in order to maintain the environmental permit discharge temperature of less than 106°F. The plant ended the reporting period operating at full power.

The plant generated 447,633 net megawatt hours and attained a MDC net capacity factor of 98.6% for the month.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

The following Licensee Event Reports were submitted during the month of **August, 1994:**

LER 94-010

On July 5, 1994 at approximately 1155 hours, both Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water systems were declared inoperable due to high differential pressure on the tube side of the heat exchanger due to biological plugging. A 30 hour plant shutdown was commenced per Technical Specifications. The heat exchangers were cleaned and returned to service prior to completion of the shutdown. The plant was returned to full power. The cause of this event was the release of Blue Mussel shells and other minimal biological debris into the heat exchangers.

Immediate corrective action was taken to clean, inspect, and return the heat exchangers to operability. Additional corrective actions are planned to inspect and clean the Emergency Service Water piping during the upcoming refueling outage and install inspection ports in the affected systems to assist in the early detection of possible future concerns.

LER 94-011

During the course of a Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) walkdown, it was discovered that the control panels ER 8A and ER 8B housing the control logic for portions of the Automatic Depressurization System and Containment Spray Systems were not restrained sufficiently to ensure operability during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The root cause of this condition was the original design. The safety significance is considered minimal as the probability of occurrence of an SSE in combination with a Loss of Coolant Accident was extremely low. Additionally, approved procedures were in place which would have addressed this concern.

Immediate corrective action was taken to install modified supports for the panels. The SQUG walkdowns are continuing and if any additional corrective actions are identified, they will be evaluated and implemented through the SQUG program.

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August, 1994

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LER 94-012

On July 24, 1994, while performing an Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) Pressure Sensor surveillance, the as-found trip setpoints for the high pressure relief function on two EMRVs were above that specified in the Technical Specifications. The cause of this occurrence has been attributed to setpoint repeatability and instrument drift. The design setpoint repeatability allows the as-found value to be within 2.5 psig of the Technical Specification limit. Previous surveillance records indicate that these instruments can drift due to changing plant and ambient conditions. This occurrence is considered to have minimal safety significance as the automatic depressurization function of the EMRVs is not affected by these pressure switches, all five EMRVs would have actuated to relieve pressure, the Isolation Condenser System and turbine bypass valves were fully operable, and manual operation of the valves was not affected. Additionally, a recent Technical Specification Change request was submitted demonstrating that an increase in the EMRV setpoints of 15 psig would have no impact on safety. The pressure switches were adjusted to actuate within the Technical Specification limit.

LER 94-013

On July 26, 1994, the reactor was operating at approximately 100% power. To facilitate repairs to a nitrogen leak on HCU 06-19, the HCU was removed from service at 1930 hours with its associated control rod at the full out position. At 2220 hours, a determination was made that the shutdown margin criteria required by the Technical Specifications could not be satisfied with the rod removed from service in the full out position. The cause of the event was human error. The safety significance is minimal. Ample time would be available for manual actions to be performed to ensure the reactor core is shutdown following a postulated event where a face adjacent control rod failed to scram. There is a low probability of such an event occurring.

Immediate corrective action was taken to return HCU 06-19 to service. The Control Rod was then fully inserted to complete repairs. Additional corrective actions taken were discussing this event in detail with the personnel involved and including this event in the licensed operator training program.

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LER 94-014

On July 27, 1994 the reactor was operating at approximately 100% power. During performance of the Reactor Triple Low Water Level Test and Calibration, the equalizing valve on sensor RE18-B was inadvertently opened at approximately 1052 hours. This action coupled with sensor RE18-D being inoperable at the same time is a violation of plant technical specifications. This event was caused by human error. An action was performed without using proper self-checking techniques. The safety significance is minimal. A loss of redundancy not a loss of function occurred. There is a low probability of a LOCA occurring during the short time both sensors were inoperable. The equalizing valve sensor on RE18-B was closed and the instrument line excess flow check valve was verified open. Additional corrective actions taken were discussing this event in detail with the personnel involved and including this event in the Instrument and Control technical training program.

LER 93-005R1

During a review of the Limiting System Setpoints in the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications, it was determined that Technical Specification 2.3.P.(2) could not be proven to adequately protect loads on the 4160 volt AC buses as designed. This setpoint, 3671 VAC $\pm 1\%$, protected Oyster Creek from a degraded grid undervoltage condition and was approved by the USNRC on October 16, 1981. During the month of August 1993, it was discovered that the possibility existed that under certain conditions some loads downstream of the 4160 VAC buses may not be able to perform their intended safety functions. This occurrence is of minimal safety significance as a degraded grid condition is highly unstable and would be of limited duration. Additional analysis was performed in February of 1994 to include the 120V Vital AC system. Administrative controls were implemented to monitor startup transformer 4160V bus voltage to ensure adequate offsite voltage available for all loads. A Technical Specification Change Request was submitted to raise the degraded grid undervoltage setpoint. Modifications to support the proposed setpoint will be implemented.

LER 94-001R1

During the design process for a Core Spray piping modification, it was discovered that the existing Core Spray Systems 1 and 2 minimum recirculation piping configuration did not meet the seismic and thermal expansion criteria allowables specified in the UFSAR. The root cause of this condition was inadequacy of the original design. The safety significance is considered to be minimal, as the existing configuration meets the ASME Section III allowable seismic and thermal expansion criteria and satisfies the operability limits. A modification presently scheduled for the upcoming 15R refueling outage will change the subject piping configuration to meet the UFSAR criteria.

Oyster Creek Station #1

Docket No. 50-219

REFUELING INFORMATION - AUGUST, 1994

Name of Facility: Oyster Creek Station #1

Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Currently projected for
September 10, 1994

Scheduled date for restart following refueling: Currently projected for
November 14, 1994

Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a Technical
Specification change or other license amendment?

No

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or
different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis
methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

1. General Electric Fuel Assemblies - Fuel design and performance
analysis methods have been approved by the NRC.

The number of fuel assemblies	(a) in the core	=	560
	(b) in the spent fuel storage pool	=	2040
	(c) in dry storage	=	32

The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any
increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in
number of fuel assemblies:

Present Licensed Capacity: 2600

Planned Increase in Licensed Storage Capacity: 45

The actual fuel storage capacity of the spent fuel pool is 2645 assemblies.
The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel
pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

Based on a projected reload of 172 bundles, full core discharge capacity
to the spent fuel pool will be lost after the 1994 refueling outage.

OPERATING DATA REPORT

OPERATING STATUS

1. DOCKET: 50-219
2. REPORTING PERIOD: 8/94
3. UTILITY CONTACT: PAUL G. EDELMANN (609-971-4097)
4. LICENSED THERMAL POWER (MWt): 1930
5. NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MWe): $687.5 \times 0.8 = 550$
6. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe): 650
7. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe): 632
8. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe): 610
9. IF CHANGES OCCUR ABOVE SINCE LAST REPORT, GIVE REASONS:
NONE
10. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET MWe):
NONE
11. REASON FOR RESTRICTION, IF ANY:
NONE

	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
12. REPORT PERIOD HOURS	744.0	5831.0	216431.0
13. HOURS RX CRITICAL	744.0	5552.0	145151.0
14. RX RESERVE SHUTDOWN HRS	0.0	0.0	918.2
15. HRS GENERATOR ON-LINE	744.0	5498.6	141700.3
16. UT RESERVE SHUTDOWN HRS	0.0	0.0	0.0
17. GROSS THERM ENERGY (MWH)	1429378	10376810	243490187
18. GROSS ELEC ENERGY (MWH)	465272	3437041	81681355
19. NET ELEC ENERGY (MWH)	447633	3305723	78353437
20. UT SERVICE FACTOR	100.0	94.3	65.5
21. UT AVAIL FACTOR	100.0	94.3	65.5
22. UT CAP FACTOR (MDC NET)	98.6	92.9	59.1
23. UT CAP FACTOR (DER NET)	92.6	87.2	55.7
24. UT FORCED OUTAGE RATE	0.0	5.7	10.3
25. FORCED OUTAGE HRS	0.0	332.5	16289.8

26. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE, DURATION):

15-R OUTAGE, SEPTEMBER 10, 1994, 65 DAYS

27. IF CURRENTLY SHUTDOWN, ESTIMATED STARTUP DATE: N/A

AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
NET MWe

DOCKET #.50-219
UNIT. OYSTER CREEK #1
REPORT DATE. 09-08-94
COMPILED BY PAUL G. EDELMANN
TELEPHONE # 609-971-4097

MONTH: AUGUST, 1994

<u>DAY</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>MW</u>
1.	598	16.	603
2.	588	17.	603
3.	593	18.	600
4.	574	19.	601
5.	592	20.	601
6.	603	21.	600
7.	607	22.	604
8.	597	23.	611
9.	605	24.	612
10.	605	25.	606
11.	594	26.	609
12.	605	27.	607
13.	600	28.	601
14.	597	29.	606
15.	600	30.	615
		31.	614

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

DOCKET NO: 50-219

UNIT NAME: Oyster Creek

DATE: September 13, 1994

COMPLT'D BY: Brenda DeMerchant

TELEPHONE: 609-971-4642

REPORT MONTH: August, 1994

No.	DATE	TYPE	DURATION (Hours)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR OR REDUCING POWER (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
		F: Forced S: Scheduled				
						There were no shutdowns or major power reductions during this reporting period.

Summary :

(1) REASON

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| a. Equipment Failure (Explain) | e. Operator Training & Lic Exam. |
| b. Maintenance or Test | f. Administrative |
| c. Refueling | g. Operational Error (Explain) |
| d. Regulatory Restriction | h. Other (Explain) |

(2) METHOD

1. Manual
2. Manual Scram
3. Automatic Scram
4. Other (Explain)