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J. T. Beckham, Jr.
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HL-1584
001474

April 19, 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
INADEQUATE PROCEDURE RESULTS IN MISSED
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCE

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning an inadequate procedure which resulted in missed Technical Specifications surveillances.

If you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Sincerely,



J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/cr

Enclosure: LER 50-321/1991-008

cc: (See next page.)

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cc: Georgia Power Company

Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch

NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator

Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000321			PAGE (3) 1 OF 4	
TITLE (4) INADEQUATE PROCEDURE RESULTS IN MISSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCE														
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2			05000366		
03	21	91	91	008	00	04	19	91				05000		
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)														
OPERATING MODE (9)		1												
POWER LEVEL		100												
		20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)			
		20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)			
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)														
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER				
STEVEN B. TIPPS, MANAGER NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE, HATCH										AREA CODE		73.71		
										912		367-7851		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORT TO NPD	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORT TO NPD	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORT TO NPD
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH DAY YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO				
ABSTRACT (16)														

On 3/21/91 at approximately 1300 CST, Unit 1 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% rated thermal power) and Unit 2 was in the Cold Shutdown mode. At that time, plant personnel performing a review of Chemistry department Technical Specifications surveillances determined that some daily channel checks had not been performed at the frequency required by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Specifically, the daily channel checks of the Unit 1 Recombiner Building Ventilation noble gas activity monitor and sample flowrate measuring device and the Main Stack sample flowrate measuring device were performed on 1/26/91 at a time of day which exceeded the required frequency of performance. This was contrary to the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 4.14.2-1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Table 4.3.6.10-1.

The cause of this event is a less than adequate procedure. Procedure 62EV-SAM-003-OS, "Gaseous Waste Discharge Monitor Checks," did not contain adequate guidance to ensure the daily checks were performed during the same time period each day such that the required frequency plus grace period was not exceeded.

Corrective actions for this event include issuing daily channel check guidance to Chemistry personnel and revising procedures 62EV-SAM-003-OS and 64CH-ADM-001-OS, "Chemistry Program."

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
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TEXT

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as (EIIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 3/21/91 at approximately 1300 CST, Unit 1 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% rated thermal power) and Unit 2 was in the Cold Shutdown mode. At that time, plant personnel were performing an ongoing review of Chemistry department procedures against the applicable Technical Specifications surveillance requirements to ensure the procedures properly and completely implemented the surveillance requirements.

Personnel performing the review determined that some daily channel checks had not been performed at the frequency required by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 4.14.2-1 requires a channel check of the Unit 1 Recombiner Building Ventilation noble gas activity monitor (EIIIS Code IL) and sample flowrate measuring device (EIIIS Code IL) to be performed once every 24 hours with a grace period of 25% (six hours). Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 4.14.2-1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Table 4.3.6.10-1 require a channel check of the Main Stack (EIIIS Code VL) sample flowrate measuring device (EIIIS Code IL) to be performed once every 24 hours with a grace period of 25%. It was determined that, contrary to these requirements, the channel checks performed on these instruments on 1/26/91 had been performed more than 30 hours after the last channel checks performed on 1/25/91.

The channel checks on the Unit 1 Recombiner Building Ventilation instruments were performed at 0715 CST on 1/25/91, but were not performed again until 1630 CST on 1/26/91. This is a difference of about 33 hours. The channel check on the Main Stack sample flowrate measuring device was performed at 0740 CST on 1/25/91, but was not performed again until 1455 CST on 1/26/91. This is a difference of about 31 hours. In both cases, the time between consecutive channel checks exceeded the Technical Specifications allowed time of 30 hours (24 hours plus 25%). The instruments were found to be operating correctly when the checks were performed.

Upon discovery of this event, a Deficiency Card was written as required by plant procedures. On 3/23/91, the Superintendent of Chemistry issued a letter to Chemistry department supervisors, foremen, and technicians. The letter stated that the Technical Specifications required daily channel checks performed by the Chemistry department are to be performed during the same five hour period each day. This will ensure the maximum time between consecutive channel check will be 29 hours, one hour less than the maximum allowable time of 30 hours.

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TEXT

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of this event is a less than adequate procedure. Procedure 62EV-SAM-003-OS, "Gaseous Waste Discharge Monitor Checks," did not contain adequate guidance to ensure the daily checks were performed during the same time period each day such that the required frequency plus grace period was not exceeded.

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) because a condition existed which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, some channel checks on radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation had not been performed at the frequency required by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Channel checks performed on 1/26/91 were performed greater than 30 hours after the channel checks performed on the preceding day, contrary to the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 4.14.2-1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Table 4.3.6.10-1.

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation (EIIS Code IL) is provided to monitor the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Its operability is verified, in part, by performance of a channel check at a frequency prescribed by the applicable Technical Specifications. The channel check, in this case required once every 24 hours with a 25% grace period, is a qualitative assessment of instrument behavior during operation by observation.

In the event described in this report, some channel checks of radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation were performed late, i.e., outside of the required frequency of 24 hours plus the 25% grace period. In one case, consecutive channel checks were performed over 33 hours apart and, in the other case, consecutive channel checks were performed over 31 hours apart. However, when the channel checks were performed, the subject instruments were found to be operating correctly, and within procedural limits for sample pump vacuum and flow. Since the channel checks were late by a short period of time and the instruments were found to be operating correctly when the checks were performed, it is reasonable to assume the instruments were operable and capable of performing their intended function at all times.

Based on the above analysis, it is concluded this event had no affect on nuclear safety or public health and safety. This analysis is applicable to all operating conditions.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

On 3/23/91, the Superintendent of Chemistry issued a letter to Chemistry department supervisors, foremen, and technicians. The letter stated that the Technical Specifications required daily channel checks performed by the Chemistry department are to be performed during the same five hour period each day. This will ensure the maximum time between consecutive channel checks will not exceed 29 hours, one hour less than the maximum Technical Specifications allowed time of 30 hours.

Procedure 62EV-SAM-003-OS will be revised to incorporate the requirements of the aforementioned letter. Procedure 64CH-ADM-001-OS, "Chemistry Program," which governs the performance of the daily sampling of the reactor coolant for gross activity and conductivity, also will be revised to incorporate the requirements of the aforementioned letter. These two procedures contain all of the daily, Technical Specifications-required channel checks performed by the Chemistry department. These revisions will be effective by 6/28/91.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Other Systems Affected:

No systems other than those listed in this report were affected by this event.

2. Failed Component Identification:

No failed components caused or resulted from this event.

3. Previous Similar Events:

Previous similar events in the last two years in which inadequate procedures have resulted in missed Technical Specifications surveillances were reported in the following Licensee Event Reports:

50-321/1989-005, dated 04/21/89
50-321/1989-009, dated 09/21/89
50-321/1989-011, dated 09/26/89
50-321/1989-016, dated 11/30/89
50-321/1990-002, dated 02/26/90
50-321/1990-003, dated 03/12/90
50-321/1990-014, dated 08/08/90
50-321/1990-018, dated 10/01/90
50-366/1989-002, dated 03/14/89
50-366/1989-006, dated 10/23/89
50-366/1989-010, dated 01/02/90
50-366/1990-007, dated 10/12/90

Corrective actions for these events could not have prevented this event because the previous events involved different Technical Specifications surveillances and different procedures.