

- I. LER NUMBER: 83-016/03L-0
- II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1
- III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373
- IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On March 8, 1983, while performing the Diesel Generator Rooms Low Pressure CO₂ Systems Fire Detectors Channel Functional Test, LIS-C0-02, the electro-thermal links (ETL) for the fire dampers in the "0" and "1B" diesel generator rooms were inadvertently fired, allowing the respective fire dampers to close. This would result in the loss of ventilation for the "0" and "1B" diesel generators, should the diesels be called upon to provide emergency power. Work requests were initiated to open all the fire dampers and replace all the ETL's.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

At the time of this event, LaSalle Unit 1 was in Condition 1 at approximately 23% power. Diesel generators "0" and "1B" were declared inoperative but they were not taken out of service, i.e., both diesels would automatically start and supply emergency power if required. The reason the diesels were declared inoperative is because during the loss of ventilation the temperature limits in the diesel rooms could be exceeded if the diesels were run for an extended period of time. In the event the diesel would be required to operate, the diesel rooms could be cooled by alternate means, such as temporary fans and opening the steel roll up doors on each room. The required action of demonstrating the "1A" and "2A" diesel generators operable was performed, therefore safe operation of the plant was maintained at all times.

VI. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was improper performance of the LIS-C0-02 procedure. The instrument mechanic performing this surveillance, misinterpreted the step which de-energizes the power to the ETL's for each diesel room. He had power to only one room de-energized, where the step called for all the rooms to be de-energized. In addition, the procedure had no place to record the operation of power supply breakers. When the test was performed on the first diesel room, the results were satisfactory. He then moved to the next diesel room, not remembering that the power supply breaker for the ETL's had not been opened. When the test was performed, the ETL's energized and all the fire dampers closed. He then moved to the third room, again not remembering to open the power supply breaker. This time when all the fire dampers closed, he questioned why the dampers were closing.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Work Requests L23029 and L23030 were initiated for the Electrical Maintenance Department to open all the fire dampers and replace all the electro-thermal links. While performing this it was observed that two dampers had not closed. The south east corner section of the HPCS D.G. room Vent. Fan Discharge Damper, 1VD40Y, had not closed because the ETL did not fire, due to an open circuit

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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont'd):

in the thermal link. The fire damper in the floor between the "0" D.G. room and the "0" D.G. fuel oil storage tank room did not close due to improper installation of the thermal link. All of the ETL's in the "0" and "1B" D.G. rooms were replaced. The resistance of all the ETL's in the "0" and "1B" D.G. rooms was verified to be between 10 and 30 ohms per the vendor's instructions, by work request L23065. The proper installation of all the ETL's in all of the D.G. rooms was verified.

In addition, the following Action Items were initiated:

- 01-83-73 To the Electrical Maintenance Department to generate a detailed procedure for electro-thermal link replacement.
- 01-83-74 To the Electrical Maintenance Department to include in LES-C0-02 (formerly LIS-C0-02) double verifications for all breaker and valve manipulations and to provide fire watches while performing this test.
- 01-83-75 To the Electrical Maintenance Department to generate a surveillance procedure to check the resistance of all the ETL's every 18 months per Tech. Specs. 4.7.5.3.c.

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