

TO: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


FROM: CPU Nuclear
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report No. 50-219/83-13/01P.
The following is a preliminary report
submitted in compliance with the Technical
Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.A.6.

REPORT DATE: March 28, 1983

Notification of the event described herein
was made to Mr. J. Thomas of the NRC Resident
Inspectors' office on March 28, 1983 at 0800 hours
by Mr. J.L. Sullivan Jr. - Plant Operations Director.

Preliminary Approval:


Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PFB;jal

cc: Director (2)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219-83-13/01P

Report Date

March 28, 1983

Occurrence Date

March 27, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Both doors of a Reactor Building personnel access airlock were open simultaneously for a period of approximately 30 seconds. This constitutes a degradation of Secondary Containment Integrity as the conditions of Technical Specification 3.5.B.1 were not met.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown for refueling and maintenance.

Major Plant Parameters:

Reactor	0 MWt
Generator	0 MWe
Mode Switch	Refuel
Reactor Coolant	70°F

Description of Occurrence

On Sunday, March 27, 1983, workers were bringing a CRD guide tube (approximately 12-15 feet long) from storage into the Reactor Building. The equipment was brought into the building through personnel airlock doors on the 23 foot elevation. Both doors remained open for approximately 30 seconds.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

At the present time, the cause is being attributed to personnel error.

Analysis of Occurrence

Secondary Containment Integrity is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive material and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the reactor building atmosphere under accident conditions. The ability of Secondary Containment to perform its function with both personnel access airlock doors open was degraded. However, the duration of this occurrence was short and personnel were on hand to close the doors, if necessary.

Corrective Action

Once the equipment was inside the Reactor Building both doors were closed and the Control Room was notified. Any other corrective actions will be outlined in the followup report.