

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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March 25, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes, Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Licensing Event Report Narrative Description

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. A. R. Blough of Region I, US NRC on March 14, 1983.

Reference: Docket No. 50-278
Report No: 3-83-05/1T-0
Report Date: March 25, 1983
Event Date: March 12, 1983
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
RD1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference

Technical Specification 3.10.A.1 states "The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "Refuel" position during core alterations and the refueling interlocks shall be operable except....."

Description of Event

Repairs were made to the refueling bridge interlock control cable on 3/13/83. Several conductors in this cable had been severed the previous day during routine refueling operations. The post maintenance surveillance test indicated that the refueling interlocks associated with bridge travel across the reactor were inoperable. The interlocks were repaired and successfully tested. Later on 3/14/83, the computer alarm typer printouts since the last surveillance test, revealed that these interlocks had been inoperable during the movement of four fuel bundles from the core to the spent fuel pool.

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Possible Consequence of the Event

A misaligned refueling bridge interlock switch prevented operation of the refueling interlocks when the refueling bridge was moved over the reactor. Four fuel bundles had been moved during the time the interlock was inoperable. The four bundles of fuel were removed from the reactor to the spent fuel pool, therefore, no reactivity increase occurred as a result of these fuel moves. The safety significance is considered minimal as no fuel loading occurred during this time.


Cause of the Event

The cause of the inoperability is believed to be rotation of the switch arm on the switch shaft.

Corrective Action

The refueling bridge position switch was properly adjusted and the interlocks successfully tested. The fuel handling procedure has been revised to require the reactor operator to monitor the operability of the refueling interlocks using the rod withdrawal permissive indicating light whenever fuel movements occur over the reactor.

Very truly yours,



M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

Attachment

cc: Mr. A. R. Blough - NRC Site Inspector
Document Control Desk - NRC