

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE

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POCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

While operating at 2.5% reactor power, under T.S.A.S. 3.7.8.1, a transfer from

Aux. feedwater to Main feedwater caused a temperature transient resulting in a

momentary power spike to 5.5% reactor power. This power spike constituted a mode

change prohibited by T.S. 3.0.4. Power returned to 2.5% within 2 minutes.

Similar LER's: none

SYSTEM CODE R B 11		CAUSE CODE A 12		CAUSE SUBCODE A 13		COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z 14		COMP. SUBCODE Z 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 8 3 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 8 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 28 29		REPORT TYPE T 30		REVISION NO. 0 32	
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 26							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

During the transfer of feedwater systems, an over-feeding of S.G.'s resulted in a 40F

cooldown. Due to a strong negative MTC, a positive reactivity addition resulted.

This reactivity addition was compounded by the operator's withdrawal of rods. Rods

were inserted and power restored to 2.5%. This situation has been discussed with all

members of the Operations Department.

8 9  
FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (28) C % POWER (29) 0 0 6 OTHER STATUS (30) NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator Observation  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
ACTIVITY CONTENT (35) NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA  
RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) Z AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (34) Z  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES (39) NA  
NUMBER (37) 0 0 0 TYPE (38) Z DESCRIPTION  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
PERSONNEL INJURIES (41) NA  
NUMBER (40) 0 0 0 DESCRIPTION  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) NA  
TYPE (42) Z DESCRIPTION  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
PUBLICITY (45) NA  
ISSUED (44) N DESCRIPTION  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
8304110463 830331  
PDR ADDCK 05000336  
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NRC USE ONLY  
68 69

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-008/01T-0  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY  
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 2  
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-65  
DOCKET NUMBER 50-336

Detailed Event Description:

The unit was at 2.5% reactor power (Mode 2) with a hydraulic snubber on the main steam system downstream of the MSIV inoperable. Since this snubber was inoperable, plant operation was limited as described in action statement 3.7.8.1 of T.S. Steam generator levels were being maintained by Aux. Feed system. A transfer from Aux. Feed to Main feed pumps was initiated which resulted in a spike in reactor power. Reactor power increased to 5.5% and within 2 minutes returned to 2.5%. Since any operation at greater than 5% power constitutes Mode 1 operation, this power spike resulted in a violation of Tech. Spec. 3.0.4.

Cause

A cooldown of the RCS occurred (532°F to 528°F). In order to negate this cooldown, Group 7 CEA's were withdrawn 4 to 6 steps. The strong negative character of MTC and the withdrawal of Group 7 CEA's added sufficient reactivity to cause power to increase to approx. 5 to 6% as indicated on the RPS channels. This increase of reactivity can be computed as follows:

Reactivity due to MTC (10 pcm/°F x 4°F)	= 40 pcm
Reactivity due to CEA Movement (4 pcm/step X 5 steps)	= 20 pcm
Total reactivity	= 60 pcm

At 2% reactor power, the power coefficient ~ 15 pcm % power

Therefore net power increase is:

$$\frac{60 \text{ pcm}}{15 \text{ pcm \%power}} = 4\% \text{ power increase}$$

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action taken included insertion of Group 7 CEA 5 to 6 steps and a reduction of feedwater flow. This resulted in a decrease in reactor power. Reactor power stabilized at 2.5% after approx. 2 minutes. This incident has been reviewed at operation department meetings. The importance of controlled changes in feedwater flow rates was discussed.