

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

March 30, 1983

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Fourteen Day Written Report
LER 83-019

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-019 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Fourteen Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.(b) as a result of entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3, "Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements, Applicability," on March 17, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

HCF:OWD/dwf/fjc
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
T. C. Nichols, Jr.,/O. W. Dixon, Jr.
E. C. Roberts
H. N. Cyrus
Group/General Managers
R. B. Clary
C. A. Price
O. S. Bradham
A. R. Koon
D. A. Lavigne
C. L. Ligon (NSRC)

G. J. Braddick
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

On March 17, 1983, with the Plant operating in Mode 1, Train "A" of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System and Train "A" of the High Head Safety Injection System were rendered inoperable for approximately 45 minutes per Technical Specification definition 1.18, "Operability." The cause of this condition is described below. The Train "B" RHR pump previously had been removed from service for preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - $T_{avg} \geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$," requires that two (2) independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) be OPERABLE for Modes 1, 2, and 3. Since the associated Technical Specification Action Statement only addresses one (1) ECCS inoperable, Specification 3.0.3 was implemented for the approximate 45 minute time period.

There were no adverse consequences resulting from this condition. The Train "A" Chilled Water Pump remained in service, thereby providing cooling water to the Train "A" Component Cooling Water pump motor and the Train "A" Charging/Safety Injection pump.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

On March 16, 1983, the Train "B" RHR pump was removed from service in order to perform preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2 Action Statement (a) was voluntarily entered in order to perform this maintenance. The Action Statement allowed 72 hours to have the pump returned to operable status.

On March 17, 1983, at approximately 0120 hours, Train "A" RHR and Train "A" High Head Safety Injection were rendered inoperable when a support system (Train "A" Chilled Water System) failed to restart subsequent to performance of a surveillance test. The Chilled Water System provides cooling water to the Component Cooling Water pump motor bearings. The Component Cooling Water System in turn supplies cooling water to the RHR pump seal and the RHR heat exchanger shell side as the heat transfer medium. Thus, the cascading failure resulted in the inoperability of Train "A" RHR. The Chilled Water System directly provides cooling water for the Charging/Safety Injection pump oil coolers.

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CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

The Chilled Water System failure is attributed to problems experienced in the starting circuitry of chiller unit XHX0001C (swing unit XHX0001C was aligned to Train "A" chilled water because the normal Train "A" chiller unit XHX0001A had been removed from service for maintenance). More specifically, the starting circuit consists of a roller cam that actuates a micro switch for circuit completion. The cam was discovered to be slipping out of alignment relative to the micro switch. After engineering review and resolution of the problem, the chiller unit was returned to service at approximately 0205 hours.

To prevent recurrence of this problem, the cams have been modified on all three (3) chiller units.

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