



# GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 270 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775  
AREA CODE 504 635-6294 246-9891

March 18, 1991  
RBG-34628  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed License Event Report No. 91-002 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

*W. H. Odell*  
W. H. Odell  
Manager - Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*W. H. Odell*  
LAE/PDG/CAB/DCH/TCS/pj

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) Isolation of Reactor Water Sample Containment Isolation Valve															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
0 2	1 6	9 1	9 1	0 0 2	0 0	0 3	1 8	9 1					0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
1		20.402(b)				20.405(e)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)	
1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)					
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
NAME L. A. England - Director, Nuclear Licensing										TELEPHONE NUMBER 5 0 4 3 8 1 - 4 4 4 5					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD5	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD5						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1059 on 2-16-91 with the reactor in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when reactor water sample containment isolation valve, 1B33\*AOVF019 automatically isolated. At the time of discovery, instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians were performing a monthly channel functional surveillance test, STP-051-4510 "Reactor Protection/Residual Heat Removal (RPS/RHR) - Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High". The ESF actuation was caused by the failure of fuse 1B21H-F76B which de-energized the isolation logic to allow 1B33\*AOVF019 to close. The fuse was promptly replaced and the valve was reopened.

Isolation of the containment isolation valve placed it in its safe position. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		91	002	000	2	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At approximately 1059 on 2-16-91 with the reactor in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), while performing STP-051-4510, "Reactor Protection/Residual Heat Removal (RPS/RHR) Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High", I&C technicians noticed that isolation logic lights 1B21H-DS24B and 1B21H-DS26B were de-energized. The test was stopped and the control operating foreman was notified. An investigation determined that fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21H-F76B, located in the control room, had failed. As a result of the failed fuse, the reactor water sample containment isolation valve (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019 automatically isolated and the isolation logic indication lights de-energized. Since the closure of this containment isolation valve constitutes an ESF actuation, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

The ESF actuation was caused by the failure of control power fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21H-F76B which de-energized the isolation logic and isolated the reactor water sample valve (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019. All the other valves controlled by this logic did not change position because they were already closed at the time of the event.

A review of the steps performed during STP-051-4510 revealed no lifted leads or jumpers being used which could cause the fuse to fail. A discussion with the technician involved confirmed that nothing was done that would result in a failed fuse. Subsequent to the event, the surveillance test was run again without incident. In addition, this particular surveillance test has been performed monthly since initial operation of the unit without causing a previous occurrence of this event. There is no indication that the fuse is undersized or that a spurious circuit fault exists. Therefore, the root cause of this event is indeterminate.

Similar events were identified in LER 89-001 and 90-018. These LERs identified three previous failures of fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21-F76B resulting in the isolation of (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019. LER 89-001 implicates inadvertent grounding as the likely cause of the failure that occurred on 1/8/89, but does not state that this is certain. Also reported in LER 89-001 was a previous event that occurred on 12/2/86. In addition, LER 90-018 reports an event in which the fuse failed, causing an isolation. In these cases, the failures were indeterminate.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

RIVER BEND STATION

0 6 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 1 - 0 0 2 - 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action consisted of replacing the fuse, resetting the isolation logic, and reopening the reactor water sample valve. As a result of the repeated occurrences of fuse 1B21H-F076B failing for undetermined reasons, all associated STPs that test this circuit will be revised to require valve 1B33\*AOVP019 to be isolated prior to performing surveillance testing. All STPs will be revised by June 30, 1991.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

There was no adverse impact on the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public as a result of the sample valve isolation. Isolation of the valve placed it in its safe position.

Note: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).