

TO: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


FROM: GPU Nuclear
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report No. 50-219/83-10/01P.
The following is a preliminary report
submitted in compliance with the Technical
Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.A.

REPORT DATE: March 8, 1983

Notification of the event described herein
was made to Mr. J. Thomas of the NRC Resident
Inspectors' office on March 7, 1983 at 1500 hours
by Mr. M.W. Laggart - Oyster Creek Licensing
Manager.

Preliminary Approval:


Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal

cc: Director (2)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No 50-219/83-10/01P

Report Date

March 8, 1983

Occurrence Date

March 7, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Discovery of a design deficiency which resulted in not meeting a Limiting Condition for Operation as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.A.9.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Mode Switch	Refuel
Thermal Power	0 MWt
Generator Load	0 MWe
Reactor Coolant Temperature	4212°F

Description of Occurrence

On Monday, March 7, 1983, after placing the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) II exhaust fan to the "Trip" position for maintenance, plant personnel discovered a design deficiency.

When an exhaust fan circuit breaker is tripped, loss of power causes the system's associated inlet and outlet valves to fail open. If during an accident situation, the SGTS is called for, the operating train could recirculate air through the out of service train. The recirculation of flow through the redundant fan may reduce the system's capability to provide sufficient flow and negative pressure in the Reactor Building.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to a design deficiency in the control power circuitry.

Analysis of Occurrence

The SGTS filters and exhausts the Reactor Building atmosphere to the stack in the event of certain accident situations in order to minimize the release of radioactive materials to the environment.

If consists of two parallel full-flow systems of filters and fans, capable of maintaining a negative building pressure ($-0.25'' \text{ H}_2\text{O}$) and retaining radioactive iodines and particulates that may be present in the Reactor Building during and after an accident.

If the SGTS had been called upon to perform its intended function while in the configuration as identified in the Description of Occurrence section, the consequences would be something less than design flow through the operable SGTS and reduced Reactor Building negative pressure.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to place the System II exhaust fan breaker back in service which closed the inlet and outlet valves. This allowed System I to operate within its design parameters.

Future corrective action has not yet been determined. Further investigation will be necessary to determine what corrective action is required.