

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)0 1 | P A S E S | 1 2 | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 | 3 4 | 1 1 1 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

CONT

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 5 | 0 0 0 3 8 7 | 7 | 0 2 | 1 6 8 3 | 8 | 0 3 | 1 7 8 3 | 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While in Condition 4 during a plant outage, RHR Shutdown Cooling was lost due to
0 3 | a Division I isolation signal to the inboard isolation valve on the pump suction
0 4 | (Technical Specification 3.4.9.2). This event occurred twice within one hour.
0 5 | The isolation signals were reset and shutdown cooling was returned to service.
0 6 | There were no consequential effects to the public health and safety. Reactor
0 7 | coolant temperatures didn't exceed shutdown cooling values. An alternate cooling
0 8 | method was available.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | C F | 11 | CAUSE CODE | X | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | Z | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | C K T B R K | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | A | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 3 | 21 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 3 0 | 24 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 3 | 27 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN | Z | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | F | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 0 0 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | G 0 8 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling and the Division I isolation signals are a
1 1 | result of the Division I Reactor Protection System (RPS) being de-energized by
1 2 | its alternate power supply feeder breaker tripping. This breaker trips on plant
1 3 | electrical system voltage and frequency transients. The Division I RPS normal
1 4 | power supply was returned to service.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | G | 28 | % POWER | 0 0 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | n/a | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | operator observation | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | n/a | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | n/a | 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 0 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | n/a | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 0 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | n/a | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | n/a | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | N | 44 | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

8304010525 830317
PDR ADOCK 05000387
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NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Jon T. Todd

PHONE (717) 542-2181 X3524

Attachment

Licensee Event Report 83-030/03L-0

While in Condition 4 during a plant outage, RHR Shutdown Cooling was lost due to a Division I Containment Isolation signal that closed the inboard isolation valve on the pump suction (Technical Specification 3.4.9.2). This event occurred twice within one hour. The isolation signals were reset and shutdown cooling was returned to service. There were no consequential effects on the public health and safety. The time in core life (minimum amount of decay heat) and the short period of time during which shutdown cooling was not in service contributed to the result that Reactor coolant temperatures never exceeded allowable values for cold shutdown conditions.

The cause for the Division I isolations was the spurious tripping of the alternate power supply breakers to the Division I Reactor Protection System (RPS). When the alternate power supply feeds the RPS, there is no isolation between the RPS system and the remainder of plant electrical systems. The alternate power supply feeds through breakers that have trip points with close tolerances to voltage and frequency. The normal power supply to RPS is through a motor-generator set which isolates electrical system disturbances from the RPS. For this event, the "A" RPS MG set was being taken out of service for preventive maintenance. After the RPS bus tripped a second time, the MG set was returned to service and selected for RPS bus feed.

Engineering is currently forecasting a 7/1/83 "Engineering Completion" date for a modification that will alleviate the problem of powering the RPS from the alternate power supplies (PMR 82-856). An update to this LER will be forthcoming when the modification package is approved. In the interim, minimizing the usage of the alternate power supplies to the RPS busses will mitigate the recurrence of this event.