

## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/3/0/2/8/3/ (8) /0/3/2/3/8/3/ (9)  
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On March 2, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 1, it was discovered that the inservice in-  
/0/3/ / spection visual examination of the interior of the Reactor Vessel was not per-  
/0/4/ / formed during the first refueling outage as required by ASME XI. Since the prob-  
/0/5/ / ability of a defect existing is remote and the inspection will be performed  
/0/6/ / during the next scheduled refueling outage, the health and safety of the public  
/0/7/ / were not affected. This is contrary to T.S. 4.0.5 and reportable pursuant to  
/0/8/ / T.S. 6.9.1.9.c.

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE  
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /R/A/ (11) /A/ (12) /C/ (13) /V/E/S/S/E/L/ (14) /A/ (15) /Z/ (16)  
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION  
REPORT NO. NO.

(17) NUMBER /8/3/ /-/ /0/2/1/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT  
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/Z/ (18) /X/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /R/3/8/0/  
(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / This event was a result of personnel error. The required visual examination of  
/1/1/ / the Reactor Vessel internals will be performed during the next refueling outage  
/1/2/ / scheduled to begin April 1, 1983.  
/1/3/ /  
/1/4/ /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Review /

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES  
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES  
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  
TYPE DESCRIPTION  
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) S PDR  
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NAME OF PREPARER E. W. HARRELL

PHONE (703) 894-5151

NRC USE ONLY  
/ / / / / / / / / / /

#### Description of Event

On March 2, 1983, with the Unit in Mode 1, a review of the Unit 2 Inservice Inspection program disclosed that the visual inspection of the interior of the Reactor Vessel was not performed during the first refueling outage as required by ASME XI (1974 Ed. with Summer 75 addendum), Table IWB-2500, item B-N-1. This inspection includes the areas above and below the reactor core that are accessible during a normal refueling outage.

#### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The Unit 2 Reactor Vessel is of the same design as the Unit 1 vessel. The results of this examination performed on Unit 1 during the first refueling outage were satisfactory with no reportable indications. Since other Westinghouse plants of comparable design have a similar history, the probability of a defect existing is substantially remote. Consequently the health and safety of the public were not affected.

#### Cause of Event

This event resulted from an administrative error. The visual examination of the Reactor Vessel internals was to be performed by the vendor along with other required ISI examinations. It was apparently postponed to a later date when refueling conditions were to be more convenient. However as the refueling outage progressed the examination was overlooked. The Reactor Vessel was manufactured by Rotterdam Dockyard Co. and the internals were manufactured by Westinghouse.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

Station management was informed of the missed surveillance.

#### Scheduled Corrective Action

The required examination will be performed during the next refueling outage which is scheduled to begin April 1, 1983.

#### Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Administrative controls of the inservice inspection program have been reviewed and upgraded. Any further changes to the administrative controls will be made as required.

#### Generic Implications

This event has no generic implications.