

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
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N	J	S	G	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
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7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	2	7	0	6	0	6	8	3	8	0	6	2	2	8	3	9
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					68	69	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80			

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On June 6, 1983, during routine power operation, the Control Room Operator observed
0 3 that the pressurizer backup and control heaters had de-energized. The pressurizer was
0 4 declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.4.4b was entered. Pressurizer pressure was
0 5 maintained within limits for DNB related parameters; pressurizer level was maintained
0 6 within the normal operating band. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode
0 7 in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

08		9		80	
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE	
C	B	11	E	12	E
COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
R	E	L	A	Y	X
13	14	15	16	17	18
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE	
0	2	8	0	3	L
19	20	21	22	23	24
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT	
A	18	Z	19	Z	20
25	26	27	28	29	30
SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	
Z	21	0	0	0	0
31	32	33	34	35	36
NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
Y	24	A	25	W	1
37	38	39	40	41	42
REVISION NO.		REVISION NO.		REVISION NO.	
0	32	0	32	0	32
43	44	45	46	47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation revealed that the control relay for the oil heater trip function had

1 1 failed, resulting in de-energization of the heaters. The relay coil was replaced,

1 2 the heater control circuitry was satisfactorily tested and the action statement was

1 3 terminated.

1 4

7 8 9

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS (30)		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)			
1	5	E	(28)	1	0	0	(29)	N/A	A	(31)	Operator Observation
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 Z 34

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
N/A

44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
N/A

45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	N/A		

8	9	11	12	13	80
PERSONNEL INJURIES					
NUMBER		DESCRIPTION (41)			

1	8	0	0	0	(40)	N/A
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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	100	
2	100	
3	100	
4	100	
5	100	
6	100	
7	100	
8	100	
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IE22

8 9 10 N/A 8307140142 830622 80

ISSUED		DESCRIPTION (45)		PDR ADOCK 05000272		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	(44)	S	PDR		

R. Frahm (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309

NAME OF PREPARER

R. Frahm

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 28, 1983

Mr. J. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Allan:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-028/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable
Occurrence 83-028/03L. This report is required within
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *JH*

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-028/03L
Report Date: 06-22-83
Occurrence Date: 06-06-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer - Inoperable

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-108.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1120 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1455 hours, June 6, 1983, during routine power operation, the Control Room Operator observed that the pressurizer backup and control heaters had de-energized. A survey of the pressurizer indications revealed no abnormalities however. Due to the inoperability of the heaters, the pressurizer was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.4.4b was entered. An investigation into the problem was immediately initiated and preparation for a plant shutdown was commenced. Pressurizer pressure was maintained within the Technical Specification limits for DNB-related parameters utilizing the charging system. Pressurizer level was maintained within the normal operating band; the heaters were returned to an operable status within 20 minutes.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the problem revealed that the control relay for the pressurizer low level alarm, heater trip and letdown isolation functions had failed, resulting in de-energization of the heaters. Inspection of the device showed that the relay coil had overheated and had physically forced the relay contactors into the open position. No recent, similar failures had been observed, no other problems were evident in the control circuitry, and the failure was assumed to be of an isolated nature.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Limits on the pressurizer include a restriction on maximum contained volume and the requirement for a minimum of two operable groups of heaters (150 KW each). The limit on the maximum water volume assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation and is consistent with the initial conditions assumed in the FSAR. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be operable assures that the plant will be able to establish natural circulation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Action Statement 3.4.4b requires:

With the pressurizer inoperable (due to other than an inoperable emergency power supply to the heaters), be in at least hot standby with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours.

As noted, the heater control was immediately restored and pressurizer parameters were maintained within Technical Specification limits. The occurrence therefore did not involve any risk to the health or safety of the public. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The failed relay coil was replaced, pressurizer heater control circuitry was satisfactorily tested, and the heaters were re-energized. At 1515 hours, June 6, 1983, the pressurizer was declared operable and Action Statement 3.4.4b was terminated. In view of the nature of the failure, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Industrial Control Relay Coil
Part No. 176C663G01

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-083