LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(1) (2) LICENSEE CODE: PATMI 1 | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | (3) LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 | (4) CAT | (5)

CONT

REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 9 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 0 2 7 8 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 2 1 6 7 8 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

In accordance with a B&W recommended operating procedure, TMI-1 has been flooding OTSG feedwater nozzles during operation below 5% full power. This condition was not analyzed in the FSAR and is therefore reportable per 6.9.2.A(9). Because this situation occurs only during startup and shutdown, the probability of a steam line break at such times is significantly less than the probability of a steam line break occurring as analyzed.

SYSTEM CODE: Z Z (11) | CAUSE CODE: D (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: Z (13) | COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 7 8 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 8 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 | REPORT TYPE: T | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: G (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

When the Main Steam Line Break Analysis was originally performed, the B&W recommended operating procedure required a 30" water level in the OTSG's at low power levels. As B&W gained operating experience, flooding of the feedwater nozzles at low power levels was recommended to prevent thermal shocking of the nozzles. The shutdown and cooldown procedures were changed to prevent flooding the nozzles when <5% full power.

FACILITY STATUS: F (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: Z (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): NA

ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41):

8307120909 790216
PDR ADOCK 05000289
S HOL

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY ISSUED: Y (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): Weekly news release

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GQL 0254

NARRATIVE OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-08/1T

When the Main Steam Line Break Analysis was originally performed, the B&W recommended operating procedure required a 30" water level in the OTSG's at low power levels. As B&W gained operating experience, flooding of the feedwater nozzles at low power levels was recommended to prevent thermal shocking of the nozzles. TMI-1 has been following the latter B&W recommended operating procedure and operates with the secondary side feedwater nozzles submerged when below 5% full power in order to avoid long-term feedwater nozzle thermal degradation. Operation with feedwater nozzles submerged, when below 5% full power was apparently not considered for the Steam Line Break Analysis and is therefore reportable per section 6.9.2.A(9).

Since these conditions occur during startup and shutdown, which constitutes a small percentage of total operating time, the probability of a steam line break occurring during startup or shutdown is significantly less than the probability of a steam line break occurring as analyzed.

Preliminary Met-Ed analysis indicates that should a main steam line break occur during operation below 5% full power with OTSG nozzles flooded, no return to criticality will occur following reactor trip. However, the TMI-1 shutdown and cooldown procedures have been changed to prevent operation below 5% full power with the OTSG nozzles flooded. Met-Ed is attempting to verify the above preliminary evaluation, and to obtain B&W's concurrence with Met-Ed's analysis.