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August 16, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Att: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report 94-012

Enclosed is the Licensee Event Report 94-012.

If there are any questions please contact Mr. J. Rogers at 609.971.4893.

John J. Barton
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

JJB/JJR
Attachment

cc: Administrator, Region I
Senior Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager

IE22

NRC FORM 366#
(5-92)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station	05000219	1 OF 4

TITLE (4)
Electromatic Relief Valve Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Limits Due to Drift

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
07	24	94	94	-- 012 --	0	08	16	94		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Sylvain Schwartz	609.971.4558

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRCT (16) (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced lines)

On July 24, 1994, while performing an Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) Pressure Sensor surveillance, the as-found trip setpoints for the high pressure relief function on two EMRVs were above that specified in the Technical Specifications. The cause of this occurrence has been attributed to setpoint repeatability and instrument drift. The design setpoint repeatability allows the as-found value to be within 2.5 psig of the Technical Specification limit. Previous surveillance records indicate that these instruments can drift due to changing plant and ambient conditions.

This occurrence is considered to have minimal safety significance as the automatic depressurizarion function of the EMRVs is not affected by these pressure switches, all five EMRVs would have actuated to relieve pressure, the Isolation Condenser System and turbine bypass valves were fully operable, and manual operation of the valves was not affected. Additionally, a recent Technical Specification Change request was submitted demonstrating that an increase in the EMRV setpoints of 15 psig would have no impact on safety. The pressure switches were adjusted to actuate within the Technical Specification limit.

DATE OF DISCOVERY

The condition described within this report was discovered during the performance of a routine surveillance test on July 24, 1994.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

During the performance of an Electromatic Relief Valve (EIIS RV) Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration surveillance, two relief valves had high pressure relief setpoints above that specified in the Plant Technical Specifications. This event is considered to be reportable as defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY

The reactor was at approximately 100% power. System pressures and temperatures were normal for full power operation.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On July 24, 1994, while performing the Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration surveillance, the as-found trip setpoint for the high pressure relief function on two EMRVs was above that specified in the Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification limit for the B EMRV pressure sensor is 1104.5 psig and 1082.2 psig for the D EMRV pressure sensor. Test results determined the setpoint for the B EMRV was at 1105.0 psig and the setpoint for the D EMRV was at 1086.0 psig.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to instrument setpoint repeatability and instrument drift due to changing plant and ambient conditions. The tolerance between the as-left instrument setpoint and the Technical Specification is 10 psig. The design accuracy for these sensors is $\pm$7.5 psig. Therefore, design setpoint repeatability allows the "as found" value to be within 2.5 psig of the Technical Specification limit.

A review of previous surveillance records indicated that these instruments frequently undergo additional drift during changes in plant and ambient conditions. A 2.5 psig additional drift beyond the 7.5 psig design tolerance would cause the instrument setpoint to exceed the Technical Specification limit.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The EMRVs are part of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) (EIIS BM). This system is designed to depressurize the Reactor Coolant System (EIIS AB) during small break Loss-of-Coolant Accident conditions so that the low pressure Core Spray System (EIIS BM) can inject. The ADS function of the EMRVs is not affected by these switches. The EMRVs also provide pressure control for the reactor pressure vessel. Together with the high pressure scram function and the Isolation Condenser System (EIIS BL), the EMRVs limit pressure in the Reactor Coolant System during high pressure transients.

This occurrence is considered to have minimal safety significance as: 1) the ADS function of the EMRVs is not affected by these pressure switches, therefore, all five EMRVs would have actuated to relieve pressure; 2) the Isolation Condenser System and turbine bypass valves were fully operable; and 3) manual operation of the EMRVs was not affected. The evaluation performed in support of a Technical Specification Change Request increasing the subject setpoints concluded that raising the existing Technical Specification setpoints by 15 psig has no adverse effect on plant safety. The drift experienced by the sensors in this report is much less than 15 psig above the Technical Specification setpoint (0.5 psig and 3.8 psig for the B and D EMRV, respectively). In addition, the reactor safety valves are designed to prevent reaching the Reactor Coolant System pressure safety limit of 1375 psig on a complete loss of EMRV relief capability.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The pressure switches were immediately adjusted to actuate within the Technical Specification limits. A Technical Specification Change Request raising the subject setpoint by 15 psig was previously submitted to the NRC. This action will minimize the risk of exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 81-40	EMRV Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration
LER 81-51	EMRV High Pressure Sensor
LER 81-57	Reactor High Pressure Switch "B" EMRV
LER 82-24	EMRV Switch Out of Technical Specification Limit
LER 90-10	EMRV High Pressure Relief Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Limit Due to Drift
LER 92-12	EMRV High Pressure Relief Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Limit Due to Drift
LER 94-08	EMRV High Pressure Relief Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Limit Due to Drift